I picked up John Haywood's The Making Of The Middle Ages : An Atlas of Europe as a treat to myself for no particular reason at all. I'm pleased to say that once again, Thames & Hudson do not disappoint. Physically, this is an exceptional product of thick paper, outstanding print quality, more than enough maps that the "Atlas" subtitle is fully earned, and accompanied by insightful, analytical text that attempts to draw out the large-scale trends driving Europe in the period c.400 – 1000 A.D.
I have two small complaints about the text. First, there are a few throwaway comments that appear to be pure bunk. Nothing very substantial*, but it does distract somewhat. Second, the balance is a little off, concentrating a bit more on the Fall of the Roman Empire than in the actual birth of European nations : an extra fifty pages here would have solved this nicely.
* One is that Marcus Aurelius inexplicably broke a tradition of emperors appointing successors meritocratically rather than dynastically, which simply isn't true at all. Another is that Britain in the Dark Ages was indeed a grim, dark place, which is massive oversimplification at best. A third, more serious accusation is that the Vikings were purely piratical, but for that one, wait for the post(s) on Neil Price's PhD thesis.
Against this, the maps are outstanding. They are not just there for eye candy, but significantly enhance the text itself : at a glance, the points that Haywood describes become clear, and trends that are complex to present in text become obvious in map form. A further compensation is that Haywood takes a much more economic, materialistic approach to history than most popular historians. He looks for the reasons driving the shifting demographics and political boundaries beyond the personal choices made by the great and good, without neglecting the importance of individuals during pivotal moments.
The only logistical issue I can raise is that it would have been extremely helpful to have a more detailed contents with a full list of maps. A better epilogue with a more thorough synthesis of the broad narrative and conclusions would also have boosted this from the "excellent" to "truly outstanding" category. As it stands, I'd probably give it... 8.5/10. Not too shabby, that.
I doubt every piece of analysis here will survive the judgement of history, and nor should it. These kinds of theories are offerings, suggestions to be made for examination, not pronouncements about what really happened. Plenty of them, though, seem very good indeed. So let's dive into what makes this such an interesting read.
1) The Non-Decline Of The Roman Empire
Haywood's interpretation of the late stages of the Roman Empire is very different from the classical, "collapsing morality and deplorable loss of manly virtues" of Gibbon and other antiquarians. The Roman state, by the start of the fifth century, would not have been much recognisable to Julius Caesar, but only in the same way that modern Britain wouldn't be familiar to Henry VIII. The original J.C., had he found himself thrown forwards into the worlds of Stilicho and Aetius, would have had a lot of radical unfamiliarity and a monstrous dose of culture shock to deal with... but if he'd persevered, he'd have been able to understand the lineage. He's have been able to say, "yep, this isn't the Empire of my day, but it's still definitely the Roman Empire".
The crucial point here is that, as in earlier times, the organisations and systems of the later Empire fundamentally worked. The structural changes which had occurred were basically sensible, necessary, and beneficial, and the Empire remained an unquestionable superpower; Haywood is excellent at stressing all this in a way that's sometimes obscured in other histories. But this is not to say that things were optimal... far from it.
The Empire had reached the innate limits of its maximum extent. For one thing, communication delays alone made further expansion hugely impractical, but worse was that the grandeur of the imperial throne – the allure of pretensions to world rule – made it chronically unstable. It might well have been possible to devise a better system of government and succession, but whether one could have actually been implemented is another matter entirely.
So things were functioning, and showing no obvious signs of collapse : the underlying problems the Empire faced were real but subtle. Past historians were too unkind to say it was all corruption, incompetence and cowardice, but there really was something rotten in the state of Roman Europe. To understand what was going on will take a bit of explaining, so bear with me for a little while.
One of the best cases of "show, don't tell" in the book is the series of maps showing the Third Century Crisis and the Tetrarchy. Something that comes across very quickly in any reading of Roman history is just how unstable the Empire really was : in its ~500 years of development, the heartlands were truly secure for perhaps one century out of that. The rest of the time it was constantly being split apart and reformed by rebellious governors, seceding provinces, and the occasional invader. But what the maps here show is just how similar the temporary fragmentation was in both the Crisis and the Tetrarchy; quite possibly, as though one directly inspired the other. The four political blocs the Empire broke into are not quite the same in each case, but they're of such similar size and number that it's impossible to believe they're unconnected.
On paper, then, the Tetrarchy was a decent plan, aiming to maintain the Empire as a very real polity without making the thing an ungovernable, bloated monster; more a federation of mini-Empires than one gigantic behemoth. It would also, I suppose allow aspiring Emperors a career trajectory which would satisfy their ambitions without burdening them with the superhuman demands of running the whole thing. It might have worked (after all, the Empire had already naturally split along such lines of its own accord), had the system had enough time to make this a cultural norm rather than being immediately undone by the phenomenally energetic and ambitious Constantine.
But there were more basic economic problems which the Empire had to grapple with beyond political management. What Rome was essentially trying to do, post-Hadrian, was essentially a Utopian dream : a stable, self-sufficient system, relying primarily (though not entirely) on its own internal resources. This meant abandoning the idea not only of imperial expansion – it simply couldn't expand any further – but also of economic growth. Indeed, limiting expansion now put the Empire, if anything, on a reduced budget rather than merely on a fixed income. The only real way to increase growth with first millennium technology, says Haywood, was to increase population : without conquest, population growth ceased, and windfalls from ravaging the barbarians dried up completely.
But to give Rome its due, it actually managed to adapt to this remarkably well. Its reorganised army – substantially larger than during its expansionist phase – consisting of border garrisons and mobile field armies behind the lines was able to handle barbarian raids very effectively, for the most part. The larger army demanded higher taxes, but most of these were paid in kind (not cash) so the effect on the economy was significant but not crippling. Even incorporating the migrating barbarians into its own military was generally successful.
There were two other major factors which proved much more difficult to address. One was that the reorganised Empire become essentially a theocracy with extremely strong state control. Your taxes might not be unbearable but you absolutely had to pay them. This was a profoundly illiberal and hierarchical society which was definitely Not A Nice Place To Live. Survival without economic growth meant iron fiscal and social self-discipline. During economic growth, the Empire could reward its citizens; when it flatlined, it became more oppressive, demanding more of its citizens than it gave back in return. For the ordinary person, there was far less of the glory that was Rome and far more of the grudgingly-paid taxes that was Rome. Consequently, they weren't especially likely to rise up in support should some invader come knocking at the gates.
Worse, and related, it was stagnant*. Of technological development, which could have given economic growth, there was naught, nor were there any fiscal innovations beyond "adjust taxes". If the Empire's moral corruption and slide into decay probably owes more to Gibbonish rhetoric than reality, then it seems that it certainly didn't do anything for its own self-improvement either. It may not have been declining, but it certainly wasn't progressing.
* Haywood says several times, without any justification or explanation whatsoever, that it was a period of chronic population decline. This is something of an annoyance because he leans on this quite heavily, but on the face of it it seems unlikely.
My reading of Haywood on this point is that this is a significantly more nuanced version than that of Gibbon. In Gibbon's thundering yet ponderous rhetoric, the Empire became corrupt and decadent because its rule was given over to people who were just worse than their illustrious forebears, out of some tired cliché that everything just entropically decays over time. Haywood's version does away with the stupid fallacy that the rulers were "just worse people", explaining that yes, there was corruption, but the systems were reformed for very good reasons. The rot in the state of Rome was not so much morally decadent leadership as it was economic pressure and a lack of ability to innovate. It was politically and technologically stagnant, and economically on a slow but irresistible decline.
2) The Fall Of Rome
Stagnation played a real role in the Empire's eventual collapse, and in this sense, internal problems were not entirely an invention of Gibbon's fertile imagination. The wealthiest, says Haywood, could indeed escape taxation through bribery and corruption, while the poorest had no choice but to pay up. The economic basis of the empire was attacked to sustain its elite; it was, in a very real sense, eating itself. The topical nature of this particular bit of commentary would seem to be self-evident.
As of course is the stuff on immigration, with Haywood describing here a very interesting feedback loop. The Empire never achieved true self-sufficiency and economic independence, and its reliance on external economies was nowhere more apparent than along its vast borders. The highly developed artisans and workshops of Rome produced luxury goods that were a magnet to external barbarians (even when they weren't being pushed onwards by warring tribes behind them), who in turn supplied the Empire with food. The problem was that this meant the barbarians were increasingly Romanised without being incorporated : the wealth of the border regions encouraged migration there and thus, without allowing them citizenship, the result was inevitably raiding and incursions. Rome was experiencing a serious crisis of short-term thinking, its own economic gains coming at the cost of strengthening its enemies.
Ultimately, Haywood basically agrees with Peter Heather. The final Fall wasn't due to a systemic problem, even if that system was flawed and did need overhaul. It was more a case of being simply overwhelmed : Rome just did not have the resources to deal with the scale of the threats it now faced. Where I think he does need to strengthen his argument, however, is in the statistics... Haywood presents the barbarian forces as so outnumbered by the Romans that it becomes a wonder they ever achieved anything. A fuller, even more economic analysis of where the tax revenues of Rome actually went might not be as enthralling as the the last, desperate victories against the Huns, but it might be more illuminating.
Still, Haywood's maps charting the collapse are an outstanding resource. At a stroke, the scale of the problem becomes obvious. Roughly speaking, the end took about a generation. There isn't really a clear moment you can say "this was the day the western Empire fell", but the classical date of 476 AD isn't a bad one.
What isn't evident from the maps alone – and perhaps what led to complacency – is why this time things were different. The initial territorial losses are clearly substantial and problematic, but not on a scale the Empire hadn't experienced before. The accompanying data and interpretation help explain what had changed. Rome's vassal kingdoms might not have seemed all that much of a deal in terms of pure territory, but they were kept subservient out of fear and respect. Once that was gone, once they realised that Rome was now a paper tiger, the final institutional collapse came very quickly. It was by no means a total breakdown of society, with some local institutions surviving longer after the central administration was lost, but the idea of Rome as a polity was ended.
Nor could it be revived. Justinian's reconquests were as economically unsustainable as the western Empire itself had become – in fact the situation was very much worse. The damage done to Italy meant that it was held by the east* as a fife by sheer military end economic force. For any armchair generals wondering if Rome could have been restored to its full glory through, say, better support of Belisarius, the answer must be a firm "no". The resources needed for this did not exist, nor could the conquest have become a self-sustaining process.
* Haywood has a nice comment that we probably can point to a clear moment when the eastern Roman Empire truly became the Byzantine Empire : the reign of Heraclius. At this point, sweeping institutional reforms, though much needed, were so radical that it became a genuinely different entity. Up until then, the east survived as very much a direct, natural evolution of its predecessor; it was indeed still the Roman Empire despite the loss of Rome. After this point it was something new, more an heir to Rome rather than its literal continuation.
There's important, much more general lessons in cherry-picking here. Sometimes people decry claims that "this time it'll be different" as a sort of fallacy. And indeed, looked at in some narrow ways, such as purely through maps, situations can appear remarkably similar, such that claiming any real differences can seem foolish. Haywood shows how this is dangerous, that while some data can be a useful guide, you have to consider the situation in its entirety. So if you want to claim that, say technological advancements won't put people out of work (or indeed the opposite), you might be right, but you can't limit your study to how previous changes enfolded – no matter how similar they might appear. You can't draw a correlation without looking at all the extraneous circumstances, examining all of the context in which previous changes happened.
Phew ! So Rome did decline, albeit more slowly than sometimes described, and the decline by itself wasn't inevitably leading to collapse. It could have been arrested, but lacked the innovation and boldness needed to do so. The east managed it, reverting from a near-total collapse into a powerful European state that kept going (albeit with varying degrees of success) for another thousand years. In the concluding part, we'll look a bit more into this, as well as how the rest of Europe fared (especially Britain), as well as considering the underlying systems at work in more detail