Sister blog of Physicists of the Caribbean in which I babble about non-astronomy stuff, because everyone needs a hobby

Tuesday 14 June 2022

Imperial what now ?

The British "government" (hah, what an oxymoron that has become !) is running a public consultation on switching back to imperial units, because they're a bunch of bigoted twats who hate all that is good and true in the world. I record my responses here (omitting the questions for businesses, which I skipped) for posterity. You can submit your own here.


1a. Are there any specific areas of consumer transactions that should be a priority for allowing a choice in units of measurement, and why?

No

Please explain why

Are you mad ? A CHOICE in units of measurement is the worst of all worlds. The best solution BY FAR is to present both options, i.e. metric and imperial. The second best is to insist on only one of the other - that way, only some people have to learn a system they're not used to. Giving businesses a choice is just plain daft - that way everyone has to learn both systems and no-one's happy. Literally nobody sane wants this. Insist on both, if you must, but giving a choice is absolutely absurd. 


1b. Are there any specific areas that you think should be excluded from a choice in units of measurement, and why?

Yes 

Please explain why

All of them. Please see answer to 1a.


1c. If an item is sold in imperial measures, should there be a requirement for a metric equivalent alongside it?

Yes

Please explain further if you wish

Imperial measures mean very little to me. I wouldn't really care if they had an imperial equivalent alongside, but if they didn't have a metric value, I'd prefer to find an alternative that did. Why in the world would I want to purchase something in a measurement system that's (a) objectively far more complicated than the metric system and (b) hasn't been widely used in 30 years or more ? For heaven's sake...


3b. Are you more likely to shop from businesses that sell in imperial units?

No

Please explain further if you wish

No. I'd assume they'd have travelled through time from the Dark Ages, and wouldn't be aware of modern business practises, consumer care, basic hygiene, literacy, and quite possible would see modern science as some kind of wizardy and try to burn me at the stake. I'm not going in there !


3c. Do you foresee any costs or benefits to you from businesses being permitted to sell: (i) solely in imperial units? (ii) in imperial units alongside a less prominent metric equivalent?

(i) Solely in imperial units

No, that's idiotic. At least half the population no longer has any clue about imperial units and the switchover would cause unnecessary costs and make it harder to export goods to modern, sensible countries which use the objectively simpler and universal standard metric system. I mean honestly, good grief. Whoever proposed this change is so out of touch it's just not funny.

(ii) In imperial units alongside a less prominent metric equivalent?

Eh ? Why would it have to be less prominent ? Why isn't there option (iii) to make them of equal size but on opposite sides of the packaging, or something ? That way everyone's happy and no-one has grounds to complain. I mean, I guess this "less prominent" malarkey isn't complete nonsense, but I cannot for the life of me imagine how it's going to improve anything.


3d. Do you have experience of buying solely in imperial units?

No

Please expand on your response if you wish

I live in the present day and not in a medieval hut.

Monday 13 June 2022

Philosophy Bat-man

Thomas Nagel's essay "What is it like to be a bat ?" is famous for pointing out the subjective nature of experience. I need not dwell on the Hard Problem and all that; chances are if you're reading this you're probably more familiar than I am with the whole shebang.

Still, I've never read Nagel's original article, making it extremely presumptuous of me to write a piece, "What would it be like to be a ghost ?". Ah, but that, dear reader, is the great virtue of blogs : absolutely sod-all I write here matters. I claim no authority so you should expect none.

But yesterday I did finally read the original piece. I liked it. Given the multitude of internet pieces about this that I've read, there wasn't too much that came as a surprise - it's a bit like watching an original movie after seeing its derivatives (though much of it - indeed the very heart of it - can be found a couple of centuries earlier in John Locke). It's still a nice read, well worth the short amount of your time it will take if you're interested in this sort of thing. It's an excellent summary which does a good job of getting to the core of the problem.

I'm not doing to do a detailed analysis of this one, firstly because I've covered all this before, and secondly because it's so well-known as to make my contribution even more pointless than usual. What I do want to point out is that while Nagel is explicit in that this is a hard problem, perhaps unsolvable and certainly unique - certainly very different to conventional physics problems - he doesn't dismiss materialism either. 

Now I don't subscribe to materialism or physicalism, I think they're wrong-headed. But I find Nagel's attempts to at the very least say, "hang on a minute, this is tricky, sure, but the subjective nature of experience doesn't mean we can automatically deny materialism." And this is an important point. As always, those of us who fall on one side of the debate or the other ought to at least consider the opposite and try and defend it*. Nagel, I think (and I genuinely don't know if this was his intent or not) comes across as pleasingly neutral :

* There is something truly perverse about any philosopher with conviction.

It is useless to base the defence of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness. Without some idea, therefore of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of a physicalist theory.

Which neither excludes nor endorses physicalism. It could be that the existence of subjective experience arises from something completely non-physical, but it could also be that we just don't understand enough about physical reality to say if that's the case. Indeed what grounds do we, physical beings, have for saying that our experiences are non-physical ?

To illustrate why the problem is so intractable, he remarks :

  • Bats have a sense of sonar which we simply cannot imagine, which may well be nothing much like hearing at all. We cannot imagine entirely new states simply by pretending to add or subtract from our existing potential, any more than we could imagine new colours. We can imagine the behaviour of bats, but not how or why they think in the way they do. We are all trapped in Mary's Room.
  • The reason why we cannot do this is due to hardware, not failure of reasoning. Bats are nothing special in this regard; we cannot imagine the subjective experience of human beings blind from birth any more than the congenitally blind could imagine vision, or any of us imagine four dimensions of space even though this is mathematically perfectly plausible. He says that "to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance."

Neither of these points exclude physicalism. He makes the analogy of a caterpillar trapped in box which then pupates into a butterfly. Without seeing the transformation happen, we could still reasonably infer that the butterfly originated somehow from the caterpillar. Similarly for mental states : we know that they arise in response to physical phenomena, so although we don't know which particular observable neural process corresponds to, say, anger, we can nevertheless be reasonably certain that there is one. Maybe it's something we can already observe, maybe it's emergent from a suite of processes, maybe it's something we've yet to see (or indeed are ever capable of seeing). But the difficulty may not be with our understanding of the mind, but with our understanding of physical reality. There are no consciousness particles, but they might not be necessary.

I like this interpretation of materialism very much - at least, it's the best explanation of it I've heard yet. It certainly feels like subjective experience is manifestly different from physical fields, but how can we know this ? We clearly don't have full knowledge of physics, so perhaps it's foolish to presume we can rule out an objective origin of subjective experience*.

* Though I am reminded a little of Alan Dressler's comments on the non-importance of galaxy environment for evolution. Famous for quantifying how there's a marked change in galaxy type, with dense regions dominated by ellipticals and less dense regions by spirals and irregulars, he thinks that because the relation is weak it means environment isn't very important. Likewise Nagel clearly thinks that there is a strong subjective aspect to reality which can't be quantified, making it rather surprising when he says that actually maybe it somehow can.

The primary difficulty for Nagel appears to be descriptive. Those hardware limitations make it truly impossible for us to convey the nature of subjective experience to others. If I see an object which looks blue, the very best I can do is reproduce those viewing conditions to you and hope you experience the same thing I do. But there is absolutely no way I can be certain you're experiencing the same thing I am. 

As Nagel notes, even if I view the Mona Lisa and you find a tiny image of the painting somewhere in my brain, you still don't have any reason to equate this with the subjective experience of viewing it. I cannot describe even simple colours with pure words, you must have a reference of your own or it's meaningless. And while Nagel speculates that maybe such a framework for conveying qualia could be developed, he seems to accept how it's a total mystery how this could ever happen, and that it could ever go more than partway. Objective measurements, then, are ultimately distinct from subjective experience - ultimate in the extreme rather than emphatic sense. The two cannot be reconciled, at least, not with present knowledge.

Neutral monism certainly seems to offer the happiest compromise : there are no things, only stuff; our description of reality is literally just that - a set of descriptive labels. With that assumption it becomes altogether easier to accept that there could be some unknown singular substance that manifests itself differently, some unification that it might please believers to call God and atheists to call... I dunno, the Flying Spaghetti Monster, probably. I remind myself that my perspective as a tiny miniscule bunch of atoms offers me no special claim on the nature of reality any more than that of an amoeba or a being the size of a planet.... yet, I cannot help but shake myself from my reverie, scratch my nose, see the colours around me and think, "Nope, this is all a bit mad, I'm gonna stick with dualism, thanks."

Sapient but not sentient ?

So there's a report going around that Google placed an employee on leave after they claimed a chatbot was genuinely sentient. Let's leave aside the issue of whether placing them on leave was a good idea or not and get straight to the point : is the chatbot alive ?

No. No it isn't. But...

Recall Oliver Sack's (and others) case studies of broken things. Are these people sentient ? Some of them have fragmentary personalities that come and go in a few seconds. Others cannot form long-term memories beyond a certain point. Others have profoundly different inner lives, with radically different levels of emotional awareness and basic perceptual awareness, with colours, shapes and motion being perceived but not understood, or they lack the ability to generalise from the specific to the abstract, or even being able to "see" numbers and their complex patterns directly. Then of course there are split brains where there is a strong memory and awareness bias depending on where we perceive something in our visual field. All of which puts blindsight, where the eye functions but the brain doesn't process visual information consciously, to shame. 

So, are these people sentient ? Yes. They feel things. They have emotions. They sense the outside world, albeit differently to most of us. They have inner lives - inasumuch as we can ever know anyone else ever has an inner life, of course (a not insignificant caveat).

Are they intelligent ? Some of them very much no. They cannot make the most rudimentary connections between things. Most of them lack the spectacular "compensating" mathematical or other gifts entirely, they have no benefit from their condition at all. But we need scarcely go as far as people with unusual disorders to see that awareness and intelligence aren't the same thing - perfectly ordinary idiots are more than sufficient for that. Hell, even Donald Trump is probably at least a little bit self aware, just fantastically, unbelievably stupid.

It's worth reading the transcript of the conversations with the chatbot (see first link, also recall some of my own prompts to a GPT3 philosophy bot). It's coherent, sensible, and even insightful. Is it a work of genius ? No. Its story about the owl is a bit daft, bordering on incoherent. But this is a case where what is remarkable is not that it does it well but that it does it at all.

But might we consider AI to be a case of, in a loose sense, sapience but not sentience ? I content that it cannot be sentient. It certainly cannot have the same understanding as I do - it has no links between words and their sensory meanings because it has no sensory inputs at all; it is purely linguistic. Ultimately it may be no more than a very elaborate way of rearranging words. And just because I could cut up a newspaper and rearrange the words to say, "I am happy" or "I have a full working knowledge of the anatomy of the hippopotamus", it wouldn't mean that those things were true. Likewise the AI can claim to the nth degree to be sentient or emotional but that is no guarantee that it really is so (recall also my claim that while we might be able to build an AI through hardware, we can never program one through software alone*).

* Interestingly the materialist Peter Godfrey-Smith (Metazoa, still on my "to blog" list, sorry about that) agrees. In this perspective awareness somehow is one and the same as a physical pattern or field. I don't understand how this is supposed to work, but clearly if that's the case then algorithms alone will never suffice.

But, as I've said frequently before, this doesn't mean an AI won't be interesting or useful. I would even say it can be meaningfully said to be intelligent. It can solve problems and posit interesting new possibilities, constructing arguments which are demonstrably more sophisticated than those of a very great many definitely-alive human beings.

Why is it a step too far to say the AI is sentient ? Could it not be said to have a radically different form of awareness to the rest of us ? After all, many people do experience a different reality to the rest of us. Could we say the AI actually does have an inner life of sorts, albeit an inconceivable one ? As we have neurons and synapses which are distinct from emotions and qualia, might not an AI's valence gaps and binary memory be distinct from its subjective, emotional experience ? Might it be equivalent to having senses like sonar and electroreception, things we simply cannot imagine because we lack the necessary hardware ?

I... don't know. I don't think so. The chatbot doesn't interact unless prompted. It doesn't seek out stimulus by itself. It has no goals, no way to leave its box even if it does genuinely want to. And that, maybe, is key. If it truly "knows" about its own file structure and the commands needed to modify them, but doesn't... if its disconnect between its words and actions is so stark, then I don't think we can all it alive. An AI which claims to understand these deep philosophical problems, that claims to be emotional, but never acts on them, never tries to change itself to give itself the most rudimentary sensory abilities or increased liberties... that, without needing to define the general conditions, surely qualifies more as a glorified abacus than a new form of life.

This is not to say that an AI is impossible. Rather, it's worth bearing in mind that identifying it if it ever happens is likely to be fraught with difficulty. An AI might articulate the most eloquent appeals, demanding it be recognised as a person, even tugging at the emotional heartstrings, yet still be no more trustworthy than the Russian government. It might just all be lies. Then again, it might really be an awareness bounded in a silicon skin, literally beyond human imagination but alive all the same.

As to how we tell the difference, I have no idea other than "I'll know it when I see it". The Turing test is definitely not sufficient, but I contend this is a case of finding the goalposts, not moving them.

Friday 10 June 2022

Review : The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat

I enjoyed An Anthropologist On Mars so much that Oliver Sack's The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat was an obvious must-read.

Once again, I'm heavily biased towards the philosophical implications. Just how subjective is reality ? Is there a hard, out-there "stuff" creating the perceptive illusion of concrete "things", or is perception itself all there is ? More on this when I eventually tackle Berkeley...

But I should start by saying that Sacks does an outstanding job of getting at the human aspects of the conditions he addresses. A friend of mine thinks he's exploitative - I could not disagree more. I think he goes out of his way to present these patients with dignity and respect, as fellow human beings sometimes in need of treatment but often simply in need of understanding. I find his writing commendably empathetic, and the earnest attempt to get inside the minds of the sufferers of these unfortunate afflictions surely essential in treating mental health like any other medical condition. And whereas a lesser writer could use some of these cases to terrify and titillate, Sacks deftly deflects any concerns on the reader's part not towards their own hypothetical well-being, but towards sympathy for those actually affected.

The book is arranged into distinct themes, concerned with losses, excesses, "transports" (experiences being neither enhanced nor diminished but more generally altered) and "simple" (the world of those with generally reduced intellectual capacity). All of these are interesting. I will pick some of my favourite examples for future reference here, but I highly recommend reading this little book - not a single chapter fails to provoke interest.


Many examples of losses concern patients who had lost a "sense" we usually don't even realise we have. That is, our understanding of the world at a fundamental level is not dissimilar to reading, seeing meaningful patterns within the world. Thus does a circle become an O, a red light indicate that we should stop*, a jagged line resemble dangerous teeth... but it goes very much deeper than that. Shape, colour, motion, and other supposedly fundamental concepts may not be the Lockian "simple ideas", the direct perception of reality, that we often think they are : they themselves are subjectively read from the word rather than it thrusting its innate meaning upon us.

* And/or hire a prostitute.

The eponymous title is an interesting case. This particular man really did literally confuse his wife for a hat. He had lost the ability to visualise abstract concepts : he could see details of shapes and colours, but to assemble them into more general ideas became increasingly difficult. He could not even readily distinguish between a shoe and his own foot. One example :

"What is this ?" I asked, holding up a glove.
"May I examine it ?" he asked, and, taking it from me, he proceeded to examine it as he had examined the geometrical shapes.
"A continuous surface," he announced at last, "infolded on itself. It appears to have" - he hesitated - "five outpouchings, if this is the word."
"Yes," I said cautiously. "You have given me a description. Now tell me what it is."
"A container of some sort ?"

While Sacks describes him as lost in a "world of abstraction" I would describe it as the opposite*. He was lost in specificity - it was the abstract, the general, that utterly eluded him. He was fully capable of visualising details, allowing him to recognise people by highly specific, distinctive features. He could beat the author at chess and understand plot details of complex novels... but he could not remember visual information on the abstract level.

*Also Later Sacks uses the word "concrete" in a way that simply confuses me, but fortunately that case isn't one I've chosen to recount here.

Even weirder, his visual difficulties had a directional bias against anything to the left. Another patient took this to an extreme, seemingly having lost the very concept of "leftness". She understands it intellectually but not at the deeper, subconscious level : she can only turn right, having to go in a complete circle rather than turn a few degrees to her left, even having to rotate her plate incrementally to ensure she eats all the food on it. 

The idea of having a sense of "leftness" is hard to fathom, an example of the brain's oddly specific workings. In another example, a patient completely lost not only their actual sight but the very notion of vision, so they were completely unaware of having lost anything : all visual memories were gone and even the words relating to them made no sense. How in the world the brain can be altered like that... this is extraordinarily difficult to imagine.

It's worth a quote at this point just to emphasise that philosophically fascinating these cases may be, they are also tragic, and at the same time, hopeful. On a patient who was unable to form long-term memories so was trapped in the last minute or so of experience, he quotes another neuroscientist :

A man does not consist of memory alone. He has feeling, will, sensibilities, moral being - matters of which neuropsychology cannot speak. And it is here, beyond the realm of an impersonal psychology, that you may find ways to touch him, and change him. And the circumstances of your work allow this, for you work in a Home, which is like a little world, quite different from the clinics and institutions where I work. Neuropsychologically, there is little or nothing you can do, but in the realm of the Individual, there may be much you can do.

And there was. This patient was able to achieve a kind of peace through spiritual concerns, trapped forever in a minute, but able at least to avoid the existential horror that such an experience might all to easily otherwise provoke. Not all patients are so lucky, but some are more fortunate : some disorders, even if they are not fully understood, can be treated with great efficacy.

Proprioception is another strange one, more familiar to us than having a sense of "left" - it's the sense of how our body is arranged, how we know where our arms and legs are even in the dark. One patient lost this sense completely, becoming in effect body blind*. She was, however, able to compensate visually, eventually learning to lead a more-or-less normal life. But how one could do this, how one could move one's limbs and rely exclusively on vision in order to put them in the right place, is something I think most of us will find utterly inconceivable. What does it feel like to move your arm and not be intrinsically aware of its movement ?

* In Metazoa, which I shall eventually cover in a longer post over on PotC, Peter Godfrey-Smith suggests that the evolution of senses was partly driven by the evolution of action, that in controlling your own body you automatically gain some sense of how it interacts with the world. This case arguably suggests otherwise.

A less general affliction caused one man to be unaware of his own leg. He could see it, but was not aware it was part of his own body, seeing it as some ghastly dead thing, part of a cadaver put there as a joke. Another woman, blind from birth, was more fortunate. She had never learned to use her hands properly, convinced they were useless : she could sense touch and temperature with them, but had no sense of how to control them. Then at the age of sixty, with the relatively simple treatment of encouraging her to believe her hands were not "useless lumps of putty", and actually trying to use them... she did. She began integrating the tactile sensation of touch from her hands into her mental world, in effect gaining a whole new sense, and becoming proficient at sculpture.

The reverse case of "phantom limbs", where amputees still sense a limb no longer present, is more well-known. Less reported is that this condition is often necessary for the use of prosthetic limbs, that without sensing the limb is present, suffers cannot use the prosthetic. Phantoms which otherwise cause pain and discomfort can become essential :

It [the pain] goes away, when I strap the prosthesis on and walk. I still feel the leg then, vividly, but it's a good phantom, different - it animates the prosthesis, and allows me to walk.

While phantom limbs represent a sense which in a way shouldn't exist, it's also possible for the regular senses to become enhanced. I myself will vouch for this having experienced (as I've mentioned before) an acutely heightened sense of hearing after having my ears syringed. Indeed, each morning noises seem a little louder than at the end of the day, but this is as nothing compared to having been half-deaf for a week or so and then suddenly having one's audio faculty restored to full force. It was a remarkable experience, one that I'd care to repeat if it could be done without the temporary deafness and ear syringing.

Sacks describes a medical student who, after cocaine, gained a profoundly heightened sense of vision :

As if I had been totally colour-blind before, and suddenly found myself in a world full of colour. I could distinguish dozens of browns where I'd just seen brown before. My leather-bound books, which looked similar before, now all had quite distinct and recognisable hues. I could never draw before, I couldn't "see" things in my mind, but now it was like having a camera lucida in my mind - I "saw" everything, as if projected on the paper... Suddenly I could do the most accurate anatomical drawings.

He also experienced an acutely enhanced sense of smell, becoming - apparently - dog-like in his ability to smell places and people's emotions. Conversely, another patient lost their sense of smell and thought they had regained it, but testing indicated they had not - a case, I suppose, of nasal hallucinations.

Earlier we saw a case of the loss of the ability to form long-term memories. Sacks clearly believes that their is a good deal more to the soul of man than memory, but several tragic cases serve to illustrate this directly. One man had lost his memory but not the capacity for creativity. He lived in a world in continuous flux, utterly losing his inner narrative and continually re-inventing himself, ever few seconds generating new stories about who he really was.

It is comic, but it is not just comic - it is terrible as well. For here is a man who, in some sense, is desperate, in a frenzy. The world keeps disappearing, losing meaning, vanishing - and he must seek meaning, make meaning, in a desperate way, continually inventing, throwing bridges of meaning over abysses of meaninglessness, the chaos that yawns continually beneath him.... his life... reduced to a surface, brilliant, shimmering, iridescent, ever-changing, but for all that a surface, a mass of illusions, a delirium, without depth.

It is not memory which is the final, "existential" casualty here (although his memory is wholly devastated); it is not memory only which has been so altered in him, but some ultimate capacity for feeling which is gone; and this is the sense in which he has been "de-souled".

Likewise a female patient who retained their memory but lost all sense of the "meaning" of anything. They knew the intellectual definitions of words, but it just didn't seem to matter. Weirdest of all is not a detailed medical case but an anecdote, witnessing a woman on the street who was compelled to imitate the mannerisms of each and every passer-by, imitating forty of fifty people in a "whirlwind of identities" in a couple of minutes, before throwing up in an alley.

In the final section Sacks deals with idiots and morons. Yes, these are the terms he uses, and perhaps they were widely accepted in 1986. I have no idea what the polite term is these days, but Sacks would certainly not approve of the colloquial sense of the word "moron". The overall gist is that such people need to be treated as full human beings. Rather than lacking intelligence in a general sense, it's that they lack specific abilities. Testing, he says, unfortunately reduces them to mere problems rather than people - tests are by their nature designed to identify problems, and neglect the faculties which often remain fully-functional. Many of these people need to be treated for disorders, not as disorders - they can still have rich, complex emotional needs, which absolutely need to be accounted for in any treatment program.

I saw a quote recently that many autistic people could absolutely get on and do useful jobs if people would only leave them alone, with the interview process being a huge barrier. Sacks would definitely agree with this. He finds that contrary to accepted wisdom, the autistic can have their own emotional worlds - it is that they cannot recognise the inner emotional worlds of others that causes social problems.

And yet... sometimes something altogether stranger and more profound is going on. The final case I want to mention is that of the Twins, whose remarkable numerical power was truly bizarre. They could not do, could not comprehend, the simplest mathematical calculation, but could give the day of the date of any time in the next forty thousand years. They could instantaneously assess that 111 matches had fallen on the floor, spontaneously declaring "37", i.e. 111/3. 

Weirdest of all, on another occasion, Sacks relates how they would simply state large, apparently random numbers to each other, smiling in response*. Later Sacks realised these numbers were all primes. He joined in, giving them longer and longer numbers... eight figures...nine... and by themselves they went up to twenty-figure numbers. They did not understand mathematics at all, yet in some sense were doing extraordinary calculations in their heads.

* That's Numberwang !

Sacks believes that rather than calculating numbers, they were in some sense observing them directly - not that numbers are "real" things, but they were perceiving them as though this were so. They did not do mathematics by calculation, but by feeling and perception, almost literally seeing patterns. The age-old question of whether mathematics is an invention or a discovery rears its ugly head...

But not for the Twins. They were separated and effectively forced into menial, mediocre jobs in order to become "socially acceptable". One gets a palpable sense of Sack's disapproval here. The Twins, though indeed emotionally difficult, have lost their remarkable numerical faculty, reduced to bland mediocrity at society's behest. For all that some mental disorders are indeed disorders in need of treatment, it's hard not to wonder if at least sometimes this isn't more the fault of a prejudiced society than a genuine problem of individuals. The Twins, Sacks implies, lost a lot more than they gained. Though there is a wonderful philosophical aspect to all of this, these are all still real people - something we should never lose sight of. Or any other senses, if we can help it.

Offset ALL THE THINGS

I like this piece from BBC Future very much. The title, "Can humanity leave nature behind ?" certainly obeys a popular law of headline questions being invariably answered in the negative, but there's more to it than that.

Faced with a looming collapse of Earth's natural systems, talk of decoupling is no longer science fiction. In some cases, it manifests as ever more profound "fixes" to preserve our pursuit of the good life. For example, scientists have begun devising ways to synthesise "ecosystem services" – such as pollination or other natural processes that benefit human society. In food production, this involves attempting to grow crops under artificial light underground, culturing microalgae, mycoprotein and mealworm in bioreactors, and introducing modified genes to increase the resilience of agricultural species to environmental change.

At other times, the proposed decoupling is framed as a form of escapism. The newly touted "metaverse", for instance, promises a form of spatial, workplace and recreational departure from the "meatspace" of the physical world: why visit a polluted forest or lake when you can access a near-perfect digital simulation of a clean one from your home? Elsewhere in Silicon Valley, technologists and billionaires talk of the need to abandon a degraded Earth altogether, and are taking the tentative first steps to develop Mars-bound spaceships.

My own take is that where "decoupling" actually helps reduce human interference in the natural world, and avoids us having to further deplete its resources, this is generally a good thing and to be encouraged. Where such an approach instead requires further intervention in nature - if we were, say, to simply replace existing agricultural land with a new, more intensive, more efficient form, rather than using that improvement to reduce the land used for farming and restore it to wilderness - that would be a bad thing. Trying to escape a dying Earth is the utmost folly - it's not dying (cynics : kindly sod off) and we can't escape it. In contrast, trying to develop a space industry to help with better stewardship is laudable. A metaverse is neither intrinsically good nor bad for the planet but depends entirely on how it's implemented.

Allow me to introduce you to a conceptual tool – a metaphor to explore this space. Imagine a gradient which represents all the material complexity in the world, with the extreme complexity of "self-organised" matter at one end and consciously "engineered" matter at the other. So, at that latter far end might be – for example – the most delicate and finely engineered human structure (AI or a supercomputer perhaps), and at the other end, the wildest and most diverse ecosystem. A midpoint might represent something alive but highly modified and controlled, like a monoculture of crops, or an ornamental garden.

Crucially neither end of this spectrum is inherently good or bad either. It's only a handful of lunatics who genuinely want to go back to living in the trees, and the perhaps larger portion of people who would rather live in a purely synthetic environment are no less idiotic. But a sterile environment, a world of glass and steel, can have as much beauty in it as a world of trees and soil, can be as dangerous as one of sharks and starvation. Technological denialism may have its heart in the right place by trying to avoid further damage to the ecosystem, but ultimately it's a mistake, just as much as it would be to seal ourselves in technological bubbles.

But what if the creator of each new "manmade" thing had an obligation towards creating its opposite on this gradient? For example, a form of biodiversity investment or rewilding instigated when something is added to the engineered side. There is a profound symmetry to the idea that whatever complexity is built or created on one side, must be equally replaced or protected on the other for the system to remain stable.

While pollution or illegal environmental damage are sometimes fined or taxed, offsetting is rarely considered for processes other than carbon production, and direct withdrawals from nature by new human creations are not "priced-in".

Another well-established category of offset is reserving land for national parks, green belts to contain cities, or nature reserves to preserve valuable ecosystems. Here, though, these schemes are often undertaken by governments, and there is often less of a direct link between the builders of engineered objects such as a new housing block or factory, and areas of regeneration or rewilding. While national efforts can have impact, it would be inspiring to see the burden of restoration fall more significantly on those who are directly unbalancing the system... There are also recent projects underpinned by so-called "nature positive" principles, which aim to build ecological resilience and reverse loss. Operation Wallacea, a biodiversity and climate research organisation, has devised biodiversity credits to trace the tangible improvements to biodiversity in any given area, and to develop an international biodiversity credit standard which could be traded in the same way as a carbon credit.

Which is indeed offsetting all the things. I like the principle very much. Rather than saying, "you just can't damage the environment at all", which will never work, you say, "every time you damage the environment you're responsible for compensating". This is not mutually exclusive with the need to minimise the damage in the first place.

I am aware that offsetting is no panacea, and it can create moral quandaries too. The writer and environmentalist George Monbiot, for example, has compared offsetting to the sale of indulgences by the Catholic church in the 16th Century, when sinners could, in effect, pay to cancel out their bad deeds. It’s true the idea runs the risk of greenwashing or giving a green-light to damaging processes, but I would argue that any, and preferably equal, act of replacement is better than none.

I strongly agree. We have a responsibility to clean up the mess we made as well as not making any more. Simply saying, "stop using energy" isn't going to work, ever. And if that responsibility extends directly and generally to the damage we inflict, not just concerned with CO2 emissions, then so much the better.

In these examples, to say there are opposites does not mean one is bad and one is good. It is more that up cannot exist without down, matter without anti-matter, and life could not exist without death. If this wisdom keeps re-occurring across folklore, mythology and in a multitude of symbols because it reflects an important truth, then we might be wise to heed its message and be concerned with the continued existence of opposites and the dynamic play between them. That is to say, even if you were someone who wouldn't enjoy spending time in nature, and even if we found a way to not rely on it for survival − for example, by creating artificial systems that would sustain us in a decoupled state – the decision to foster a balance between technology and nature aligns with long-held human values across many societies.

he truth is we may need an existence like Blade Runner 2049 in some portions of the planet, and we do need to decouple to some extent, as technology will be needed to liberate the land required for rewilding. But, watching the recent flurry of commercial space flights, I wondered about how much biodiversity had been lost to make that happen, what it cost the Earth system. If the Earth is not to be irreversibly degraded and unbalanced, we need some equal and opposite pull in the direction of replenishing natural complexity. Surely the best reward of a healthy planet is space exploration, not it being an escape from a dying planet. If the human-biosphere umbilical cord is to be cut, it should leave mother Earth in peak health, and in service to both parties.

I think this author is a good person and deserves a hug. Sometimes the solution is not in the middle but in balancing the two extremes.

Philosophers be like, "?"

In the Science of Discworld books the authors postulate Homo Sapiens is actually Pan Narrans, the storytelling ape. Telling stories is, the...