Sister blog of Physicists of the Caribbean in which I babble about non-astronomy stuff, because everyone needs a hobby
Showing posts with label Review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Review. Show all posts

Monday, 3 August 2026

Review : The Odyssey

I seem to have a habit of reviewing Christopher Nolan movies so I can hardly not cover The Odyssey. I'll keep this one spoiler-free.

In some ways this is essentially Project Hail Mary but in space. That is, it's definitely excellent – outstanding, even – but I don't think it's going to "change cinema forever" or anything as hyperbolic as many reviews make out. Or perhaps, Dune. It's certainly a cinematic feast and an absolute spectacle, and possibly the best version we'll ever get. Perfect ? No. Thoroughly enjoyable ? Absolutely. An easy 9/10 from me.

The Dune comparison also holds up in its sheer physicality. Things are intense, and thankfully Nolan seems now to be well out of his "let's make everything deliberately inaudible" phase. In fact, the screams of the Cyclops might well be the best audio effect I've ever heard. I'm convinced that some of the scenes, especially the storm(s) at sea, are actually louder in the cinema than they would be in reality, but the intensity is used very deliberately and selectively. I don't think I ever had any difficulties hearing anything.

The visual spectacle is equally compelling. Again, Nolan appears to have gotten over his "CGI is worse than Hitler" pretentious attitude and uses it sensibly and judiciously, where practical effects just wouldn't work. It looks, sounds, and feels stunning from start to finish. The creepy design of the Cyclops and the monstrous nature of Scylla are particularly well done : the Cyclops looks far more like a creature than an overgrown one-eyed man, while Scylla looks almost like an alien animal, something other-worldly. These are not ordinary mortal beings ramped up to 11. Nolan may have minimised the gods, but he doesn't hold back on supernatural : similarly, Circe's transformation of the crew into pigs is downright nasty. This is a scene that's more visceral and earthy than I would have expected from someone I associate with perfect cinematic cleanliness. It works brilliantly.

About the only other thing I would mention visually is the oddly contrasting aesthetics. Odysseus' palace looks interestingly archaic and pagan inside, dim and gloomy and lit by dark flame, but with a staircase that looks like something you'd more associate with something found in the home of an ultra-minimalist serial killer. Weirder yet is the palace's positively ruinous exterior. This isn't unique either : Athena's temple also has an interesting primitive vibe (as does Troy), but with a rather strange look as though nobody could afford to hire a cleaner or do any routine maintenance. Circe's island reminded me more of Tintagel than the Mediterranean, which was a little jarring*. And Agamemnon looks a bit like a scary robot while Odysseus' crew wear simpler but anachronistic armour – even when they're just rowing a boat.

* It was actually filmed in Scotland so I wasn't too far off.

It does work overall though. The palace looks like a palace, the temple looks like a temple, Agamemnon is clearly the leader even without saying a word, and Odysseus' crew are clearly a band of warriors. It's simple, iconic, and immediately clear to the viewer what's going on.

The storytelling is where it shines. Nolan's use of flashbacks to fill in the essential details of the Trojan War is carefully controlled, follows the overall structure of the poem, and fills in relevant similarities and necessary parts of the narrative exactly when needed. The moral aspects come through clearly without being overwhelming*. Nolan's choice of which parts to emphasise and which to discard feels like the most balanced approach possible.

* Though, I would say that its needs to reduce the mentions of both "Zeus' Law" and the "Sea Peoples" by at least a factor of five. Honestly if you make a drinking game out of either of these, you'll be dead by the end of the film.

Nolan does make some deviations from the poem, but I think he does so in a self-consistent way that doesn't undermine the source material. Whereas the original Menelaus and Helen live happily ever after, here they're at odds. Menelaus is a dominant masculine archetype, but Helen isn't afraid to push back. At the same time, Menelaus clearly has massive respect for Odysseus' cleverness that lends him some interesting depth. He's a brute, but not a villain... though he does look disconcertingly like Andrew Tate.

The Penelope/Telemachus dynamic is handled similarly well. Penelope is clearly torn by competing forces : wishing her husband had never left, desperate for his return both for selfless love and a purely pragmatic desire for security, wanting to do the best for her son but not yet ready for him to assume his father's throne Telemachus would have been easy to make into an annoying Wesley Crusher-type git, but to his great credit, Tom Holland manages to avoid this. 

As for Odysseus himself, I think Matt Damon has become a fine actor. He takes a highly understated approach and I would actually have liked a bit more direct emotion from time to time : he could do with getting properly angry and (especially) distraught at least once or twice. There's a particularly poignant scene in the poem where Odysseus breaks down and weeps at memories of the war that I think would definitely have been a useful addition. At the same time, his massive PTSD comes through in other ways, and I think Matt Damon largely succeeds in giving the character latent tension rather than merely not bothering to act in a more thespian fashion.

Practically every other objection I have falls firmly into the "would be nice to have but not necessary" category as well. I like the "Nobody" joke with the Cyclops, the shade of Achilles lamenting his fate in the afterlife, Athena going in disguise as a man... none of these really need to be in the movie though. Excising these, in my opinion, allows Nolan to keep focus on the tale he wants to tell, without omitting or changing any of the key themes of the original.

Finally, I have to mention classicist and translator Emily Wilson's notorious and scathing criticism. It's a worth a read, because it brilliantly highlights exactly those key themes in a way that's better than I could have done. It's also a pile of garbage. Among many, many other things, Wilson is oddly fixated on :

  • The colour of the sea not being purple
  • The lack of time spent watching Odysseus building a boat
  • Christopher Nolan having some sort of drowning fetish (seriously, which Nolan films has she been watching ??)
  • Odysseus not being horny enough
  • The movie somehow being a veiled criticism of Brexit and the War on Terror
  • Odysseus spending too much time worrying about not telling Sinon he was going to die
  • Lack of exposition / too much exposition / unclear motivations (even when the characters directly state why they're doing things, which in my view helps provide explanations Homer never did but should have done)
  • The supposed lack of internal moral consistency, despite the fact that this is clearly bollocks.

This last particularly irked me because it's even more nonsensical than the rest of the post. Wilson picks up on many moral points that would probably have taken me a lot longer to draw out, but she gets them all catastrophically wrong. Being laced with militant feminism – she seems to hate all the female characters because.... well I don't really know why at all – doesn't help, but the way she seems to get everything completely backwards is damned odd.

The law of hospitality is only the most egregious example. This is a recurring theme in both poem and movie, with respecting hospitality to strangers being literally sacred. Admittedly, in the movie, the reason give is rather blunt and transactional : that guests might be gods in disguise. This is morally uninteresting but understandably simplified for the sake of a movie, but what's handled really well is the use and abuse of the law. This kind of law only works when enacted respectfully, when both sides understand the limits to which it should be used. Its wanton misuse by the suitors leaves Odysseus with no choice but to disregard it, leading to calamity and even the ruin of civilisation. 

Like royal power, sometimes the whole point of giving authority is to deny its use : either entirely, or only to limit how far it's actually applied or restrict who gets its. Holding back, showing restraint, sometimes leads to more power rather than less. And with the law based on the authority of the gods, when it fails – when it's revealed as ineffectual – it can't be mended. The only alternative is an entirely new order.

My final points connect to this in a somewhat convoluted manner. Weirdly, Wilson laments that the movie is soaked in spectacle and there's always some loud exciting thing going on. This is a blatantly false claim, as there's plenty of brooding silences and quieter scenes that lend all the more impact to the noisy bits. Complaining there's too much happening here is surely a case of complaining there are too many notes. But even worse, this deeply flawed criticism misses the point that Odysseus goes through all of this, and so the viewer experiences all this intensity, as part of a journey of self-discovery. He has to overcome the external challenges, to be pushed to the very limits of endurance, before he can confront his own doubts and his own world view.

Yes, obviously that's all a horrible cliché, but this is literally the first such tale in Western literature, so it doesn't count.

The movie is explicit, and I think rightly so, that Odysseus' voyage away from Circe on a tiny raft into the turbulent sea is quite different to his earlier heroics, a leap of faith that tests him as never before. We don't need to hear some internal monologue to get this. We, the audience, can be rightly expected to fill in these kinds of gaps for ourselves; likewise, while I think some egregious violence in the sack of Troy would have helped explain Odysseus' inner torment, it isn't necessary. Wilson, on the other hand, seems to want the exact inverse of what makes the movie a success : she wants more exposition where none is actually needed and less in the (few) places where it's too much.

Anyway, for me it's a massive hit. It has definite re-watching value, as befits one of the world's oldest stories. There will be surely be more Odyssey adaptations in the future, but this one is likely to set the benchmark for decades to come.

Sunday, 12 July 2026

Review : The Slavic Myths

It's time to resume my extensive mythology review series with another outing from Thames & Hudson. This one, simply called The Slavic Myths (authors Noah Charney and Svetlana Slapšak), isn't part of their "Myths That Shape The Way We Think" series that first got me hooked on T&H, though it's pretty close. It doesn't quite examine how the myths have influenced our modern-day thinking, but it presents much the same sort of literary analysis : what the myths mean, how they originated, and a description of their variations. The format is to give chapters as pairs, with the first presenting a retelling of the myth using its major elements, and the accompanying second chapter giving the analysis.

As with the other T&H mythology books, this is excellent. The retellings are written in a modern, accessible way, with plenty of description of both the environment and the emotional states of the characters (a tad simplistic, but more than enough to get the job done). We also don't get laden with the endless hyperbolic "twee" that so often plagues so many early fairy tales : that is, we don't get a dozen castle fairer than man ever saw in the same story, nor dozens of chaste maidens* each more beautiful than the last.

* Often not-so-chaste by the end of the story, mind you.

The analyses are extremely clear, interesting, and without pushing any agenda except to convince the reader that Slavic myths are really cool. They also have the touches of humour that are quite frequent in T&H, e.g. "Koschei the Deathless was now Koschei the Dead". 

There are two things I especially like here. First, it points to a possible connection route between the Norse and Greek myths, which otherwise seem so similar yet so far separated from each other. Second, there's much more of a horror aspect than in other mythology books, which makes everything feel both familiar and novel. It's not that the other European folklore and mythology lacks its darker side, but here the intention is much more straightforwardly, and far more frequently, designed to scare the reader*. More on both of these below.

* Exceptions that prove the rule : The Dead of Winter (Europe) and Of Doves And Ravens (Wales) both have collections of horrifying legends, but both but both are deliberately curated as such. The point is that there's relatively little of the fear factor in other mythological collections more generally.

I'm giving this one a solid 8/10; I could easily be persuaded to bump this to 9 if it was just a bit longer.

Right then, here are my personal highlights. I'll try very, very hard to keep this concise.


Singing Slavs

The early Slavs were not your typical bunch of barbarians. They were described by some writers as monotheistic and democratic, preferring wailing to warfare... okay, maybe I'm pushing the alliteration too hard. But while large and muscular, they would rather sing and dance than fight anyone, which isn't your typical description of a heathen people from a late Roman source. Certainly this wasn't a universal, as Slavic kings were definitely a thing and they had a rich pantheon of gods, but maybe some local tribes were exceptional. It's otherwise a very strange thing to just make up.

The Slavs were also never a politically unified people. Being prolific, they spread out over a huge geographical area, merging with the locals as they went.  They were, in fact, sophisticated singing Slavs, highly cosmopolitan and multicultural. So much for some ghastly vision of early European racial purity a la Elon Musk's fascist idiocy.

They also persisted with paganism (aargh ! I can't stop it !) until at least the 9th century, in some cases into at least the 1400s or even very much longer. Not all of this meant harmony with nature and singing nice songs about flowers... some of the descriptions of temples adorned with animal horns and carved gods make them sometimes sound somewhat sinister.


Scary Slavs

The Slavs didn't have a monopoly on frightening folklore, but it does seem to have been more predominant than in other cultures. By far the best known examples are, of course, vampires and werewolves.

Vampires

While belief in both creatures go back to truly ancient times, like the Welsh beliefs in the gwrach ar rhibyn, such ideas persisted into the much more recent past. The craze that would eventually become the fully-formed modern idea of the vampire seems to have begun in 18th century Serbia. The earliest versions concern commoners, not nobles, who would rise from their graves to kill the living, but it took longer for them to develop blood-drinking attributes and the host of other supernatural powers that are the mainstay of modern vampire lore.

What they did already have was a vulnerability to crosses (in the retelling here, the cross even bursts into flame when they confront the vampire), holy water, and of course a stake through the heart. But not because it would make them explode Buffy-style, because they couldn't be truly killed at all. Drowning the corpse in holy water, staking it, and burying it under heavy rocks couldn't kill it... because it was truly already dead : all these measures could do was stop it escaping. And it must be pretty scary if you really believe that the corpse you just faced is still writhing underground at night, hoping for a release to resume its hunt for the living.

Other dramatic elements include a report where the stake couldn't penetrate the corpse, or, conversely, where impaling caused the whole grave to fill with blood. One other key aspect of the early legends was the idea of vampires as contagion : if the first rumours didn't include vampire propagation by bite, they they were certainly associated with plague and illness. It's easy to see how the association could itself become personified, with a supernatural explanation for viruses filling in the gap of germ theory.

Werewolves

These seem to have been much closer to their modern incarnations from the word go. Originally, vampires and werewolves may even have been two words for the same monster, and hence the attributes of one eventually merged with that of the other. Werewolves were from the outset creatures that had to feed on blood to survive, couldn't enter a home unless invited, could control the weather, and were also vulnerable to stakes. They differed from vampires in their shapeshifting abilities, their familiar aversion to silver (less widely-known is that other metals could kill them, but only if left in the body), and that they were very much still alive : they were notionally immortal and extremely hard to kill, but not because they were already dead.

Some werewolves seem to have been the familiar near-demonic monsters, but others were suicidal over what they'd become; the very earliest were just shape-changers with no other connotations. They had associations with the Moon, but also the Sun, with the whole "must transform under the full Moon" business being a much later invention, and most early werewolves were dangerous the whole time. Some particularly grisly tales include cannibalism, incest, infanticide, and mutilation. It's hard to escape the feeling that the Slavic myths could indeed be a lot nastier than some of the other European stories... which makes them all the more fascinating.

Whereas vampires (in this relatively modern era) started in Serbia and spread outwards, werewolves were much more widespread. One of the stranger things, to me, is that while investigators of the same time had no issue with the reality of vampires, witches, ghosts and other supernatural creatures, they usually took great exception to the idea that a man could physically transform into a wolf. The same people that believed in blood-sucking undead demons would suddenly turn positively woke, deeming supposed "werewolves" to be the product of deranged minds in need of mental health assistance. Quite why this should be the point where people finally decide that this is all getting a bit silly is not at all clear.


Sexist Slavs

Well... partially. I don't think you can really spin one single coherent narrative on gender issues here. There are mermaid-like creatures living in freshwater who lure men to their deaths with the promise of sex, but there are also male versions who seduce women; more rarely, the lucky "victim" gets to rule the underwater realm. Perun, the supreme god, is largely associated with thunder and lightning but also fertility – but more in the harvest sense rather than sexual. And female goddesses seem to be just as complex as their male counterparts.

The retelling of the story of Libuše, the fairytale founder of Prague, encapsulates this complexity. In the story she's a wise and revered ruler, but because she makes one mistake that a single man can't tolerate, she's forced out in favour of an "iron king". One the one hand, female rule seems genuinely admired here, but on the other, she's still usurped for no good reason :

"You want a man to rule you. You want someone to drag your children away from you to serve him, to kill and die for him. You want a man who will tax you the way you deserve to be taxed, taking your best cattle and horses. You want to serve a harsh master and to pay for it. None of this I have asked of you, and yet... you want to be dominated rather than shamed by having a woman ruler."

And yet even here, the "iron king" they get is strictly a metaphorical one who uses his iron ploughshare as a table, not because they actually do want a man's man to tell them all what to do. He turns out to be quite a nice chap, in fact.

Then of course there are female monsters, which are far from gender-focused. There are witches that are yet another variant of the undead, rising from their graves to eat children (in Slavic belief they are distinctly creatures, being always old – you can't learn to be a Slavic witch). There are Baba Yagas, sometimes hideous and hostile cannibals – in the story here she lives in her hut on hen's legs inside a fence of human bones – but sometimes helpful. Baba Yaga is not a straightforward monster like an ogre : even when aggressive*, she must obey certain rules rather than skipping straight to dinner time. As with the Norse, then, there are definitely sexist tendencies present, but it's nothing whatever like the modern notion of a simpler past when men were men and women were ornaments.

* And she can be as terrifying figure as any vampire. Huge and horrible, she flies through the forest in a mortar and pestle, the trees opening up to let her pass. 


Supernatural Shamanic Slavs

The pantheon of Slavic gods is easily as complex as those of the Norse or the Greeks. Like them, these were not personified forces like the early Roman gods, but distinctly human, and could have multiple, unrelated associations. Veles, a devil-like figure, was associated with swamps, caves, and dark places, but also the god of music (well, the devil has all the best tunes), wealth, and poetry. A strict good and evil dichotomy appears to be absent. Perun's status as supreme god, and his associations with thunder, give him similarities to both Thor and Zeus, but his lack of sexuality also makes him very much his own entity. 

There's also a character to Slavic beliefs which is distinctly primitive and primal. Like the Norse, they believed in a world tree, though of oak* rather than ash and a simpler structure of three worlds (the underworld, the middle earth, and the heavens) rather than the much more complex version of Yggdrasil. This also seems to have been mirrored through a three-headed god; like the Celtic mythologies, the connection to nature feels more prominent than in Graeco-Roman myths.

* Or sometimes hawthorn, more on which below. It was also gnawed on by a great dog, much as Yggdrasil was attacked from below by dragons, causing it to shake.

Similarly, the shamanic nature of Slavic belief is seen in the idea of a human-animal continuity. Much more on this when I (eventually) cover Neil Price's PhD thesis, but the basic idea was that humans and animals were fundamentally similar, each being thinking entities with non-corporeal souls. But there's also an aspect of something even more mystical, a sort of life-force of the world that could be drawn on for power that's nothing like praying to a god for assistance. This is the old magic.

Shamans could tap into the elemental forces in a variety of ways, some positive, some negative. They could defend their own tribes against other supernatural foes, but they could also amass in groups and war with each other. One of the more bizarre aspects consisted of them using cadaverous crampons : using human veins and arteries and tendons to give them sinewy snowshoes for climbing. Other shamans were believed to have dragon-like wings and superhuman strength, while others could do battle by sending out their souls (in one case even from a barber's shop). Even Saint Nicholas – yes, that one, Santa – may have shamanic tendencies in his battles with wind and thunder.

The landscape itself also formed a key part of belief. While water presents entrances to another realm as it sometimes does in Greek myth, this is considerably more frequent in Slavic and Celtic stories : here the protagonists can, and frequently do, wander into other worlds accidentally, whereas for the Greeks and Romans this required extreme effort. In Slavic tales specifically, water could hold the souls of the dead, with offerings made to appease the souls and mirrors covered after a death to prevent the deceased from watching the living.

Finally, plants also play a major role in Slavic sorcery. Stakes to incapacitate vampires and kill werewolves need to be of hawthorn, not just any old pointy stick. Hawthorn trees would be planted on the graves of such creatures to help hold them down. The hawthorn tree itself, say the authors, was seen as a liminal space, a boundary between the living and the dead (possibly in part due to its blood-red berries). It could be inhabited by demons who needed to be propriated with small offerings, or bound in the tree with metal horseshoes. Walnut and pear trees, on the other hand, were the abode of witches, while linden trees could travel by magic, and others conveyed the wisdom of medical knowledge. Cabbage, oddly, was seen as a phallic symbol. 




So that's my first brief foray into Slavic lore. Like the mythologies of other cultures I've been reading, it has elements of the bizarre and the fantastical, some striking similarities to other traditions and some aspects which are all its own. It feels like this is a whole European subculture which is far too often overlooked; even Neil Price, who goes to considerable lengths to draw associations between Viking beliefs and shamanic practises, barely even mentions Slavic culture beyond that of northernmost Europe. And this is unfair, because the stories here are easily as sophisticated as anything else in Europe. 

When I describe them as primitive, I mean not that they're stupid, but their base appeal to the blood : the imagery of the dead rising, or of ripping out arteries for climbing gear, is one that resonates viscerally. You can't contemplate a man becoming wolf without a physical sense of fear of the animal within, just as a cannibal witch with a garden of bones is a symbol too potent to be easily dismissed. This does not mean the stories were simple. True, they did not have the vast, pseudo-history like structure of Greek myth, but only because the Slavs were so much more spread out; individual stories, were easily as complex as anything in any other mythology.

Charney and Slapšak's stated goal is to introduce readers to Slavic folklore and encourage further reading. For me they've succeeded : I'm already reading Flame Tree's much longer Slavic Myths & Tales. I just hope that darker edge isn't just the result of this particularly careful curation... give me a single bloodsucking vampire over any number of ornamental princesses any day of the week. Sod the nondescript castles and wish-fulfilment and give me something scary.

Thursday, 9 July 2026

Review : Unruly (II)

Welcome back to my take on David Mitchell's Unruly. Last time I looked at Mitchell's non-kingly words of wisdom (and a few parts which were questionable) on a basically random collection of topics. This time it'll be much more focused on the main subject of what David Mitchell thinks made for a successful medieval monarch. This is going to be very medieval-centric; if you want to draw out what's still useful for modern rulers, go ahead, but that's very much left as an Exercise For The Reader.

All of these are, of course, only guidelines. It's possibly to get away with flagrantly violating almost all of them, depending on the circumstances. But while a skilled ruler might well be able to ignore any rule, and even at least bend all of them from time to time, they almost certainly couldn't completely avoid all of them forever.


Listicle 2/2 : David Mitchell's Top Tips For How To Be A Successful King

Be legitimate. The rules of succession were actually somewhat flexible and varied continuously (I still can't for the life of me figure out why John of Gaunt wasn't king) but they were usually clear. Once everyone can see "the rules say it's clearly Tim's turn next" then it becomes a lot harder to convince anyone it should actually be Fred. Lacking a constitution is actually a strength here, because there's no procedure for changing the rule book. There's no system to game except naked strength, and most people, most of the time, don't really want to go down that route. Rewriting unwritten rules is a whole lot different from rewriting actual... well, writing.

Ideally, you need a very clear reason why you should be next in line, not a terribly convoluted chain of vague connections or lots of individually-unconvincing reasons like Henry VII. He won and all, but that was because of the extenuating circumstances of decades of preceding warfare and Richard III being even worse than Richard II. And poor old Matilda was very clearly the heir apparent, but Stephen managed to oust her because he had a penis and that was apparently quite a high priority for most of the nobles at the time. So "being legitimate" isn't a guarantee of anything, but it does usually count in your favour.


Be openly pre-acknowledged. If people commit to you as heir before you ascend the throne, so much the better. This is by no means a done deal (again, I'm looking at you, Stephen) but it does help. Trying to actually have your heir anointed as king before you yourself die, however, was tried in England but it never caught on : people found it confusing as to who was actually the king – not least of all the heir themselves, who might get ideas ahead of their actual designated time. Still, telling everyone – in public, please, I'm looking at you, Edward the Confessor – who you want to take your place definitely helps.


Don't have a minority. It's best if dad dies when you're a grown-up so you can learn the art of kinging directly from him. He alone doesn't have any competing interests. He alone isn't trying to curry your favour, because he's king and you're not (yet). Everyone else, however, is likely to try and mould you to their own interests. In the particular case of Richard II, everyone telling him he was the epitome of regal magnificence without actually teaching him how to rule was a downright catastrophe.


Convince people you're magical. The power of coronation seems to have grown from something incidental – initially it was far more important to be acknowledged by the Witan – into something literally transformative. It was as though putting on the crown for the first time conveyed some magical change from mere mortal into divinely-appointed ruler. This kind of ritual helped turn the Dark Age thugs with the biggest swords into medieval kings, ultimately just guys with gold hats but now viewed as set apart from other men.


Remember the pretence (I). The tricky bit, the balancing act, is to convince other people you're magical while not falling for it yourself. Richard II fell for it and he was one of the most useless of the lot. You also can't just not bother to pretend though : start convincing people you're not special and there's nothing to stop them form having a go themselves, as happened in the early days of the Tudors, when everyone knew that Henry VII's claim to the throne was as weak as Donald Trump's claim to healthy genes. 

The wise kings, the ones who actually ran things pretty well – Alfred, Athelstan, Henry I, Henry II, Edward III, a few more – knew that their actual hard power was very limited. Their strength came from persuading their subjects, which meant being ruthless when they had to be but also magnanimous when they could. They were disciplined in their use of rewards and punishments alike, never pushing the social norms too far, but also seeking to bend them to their own ends rather than simply going with the flow of the historical currents. They listened, but they also directed. They found a balance.

Certainly you can't adopt John's approach, which, in Mitchell's words, was simply, "I'll do what I fucking like". At that point there was, he says, a widely-understood notion, sincerely believed, that a king's kingdom was literally his own personal property. But previous rulers didn't like living in a shithole so had tended to treat the kingdom in a way that everyone could basically accept. John didn't mind living in a shithole, so broke this convention and ultimately that, in turn, broke him.

Ironically, Mitchell suggests John may actually have been an atheist, co-opting the notion of divine appointment for his own cynical gains without ever really believing in a damn thing beyond himself. When you start doing that, or when you stop questioning yourself, others will start asking the questions for you... awkward questions like, "are we really sure about this one ?".

Like the modern royals who have absolute power provided they promise not to use it, some degree of medieval power wasn't supposed to be actually used, or at least certainly not on a whim. Going down that route was what forced systemic change, not any high-minded ideals about trying to be nicer to anyone. People are naturally averse to questioning the system, but they absolutely will if you push them far enough. Power is seen as legitimate only when it's not abused. 

So promote yourself and believe in yourself, but remember the system is all make-believe. Deep down, everyone knows this, but by default they'll go along with it as far as they can. Don't give them a reason to rock the boat and they won't. And for crying out loud, try and make the system work rather than reforming it, because reform leads to fundamentally dangerous instability.


Remember the pretence (II) : Pay homage to those weaker than yourself. If a ruler you owe fealty to is actually weaker than you, render homage to them even so. This flatters them, humbles you, and doesn't alter the balance of hard power. Doing it the other way around is seldom a good idea as this just rubs it in their noses. 

For example, if Edward I had just treated the Scottish with more respect, rather than instantly assuming his conquest was complete and perfect immediately, he probably would have had an easier time of ruling the place. A lot of kingship does seem to be about the symbolism of power as much as exercising it, as it was with the Roman Emperors : the competent ones would have the dignity to pretend to be humble and not max out on the worldly pleasures that were notionally theirs to command. The attitude of pretending not to be rich and powerful seems to me one of the key ingredients to securing real wealth and power. Flaunting it unnecessarily is a sign of weakness and political incontinence, not the hallmark of the truly powerful.


Remember the pretence (III) : Convince everyone they've won. Or as Mitchell puts it, Henry VIII was like a "big, smelly, terrifying Good Friday agreement". Protestants and Catholics alike thought he was one of them when really he was all about himself. Now Henry VIII was not a successful king, but he did retain power. He was essentially an overpowered screw-up, with almost everything he did going badly wrong, but he did understand how to wield his power to avoid losing it. This strategy, though, is again something that works best from a position of strength, a sort of iron fist in a velvet glove. If you have the strength to enforce your rule, you'll be all the stronger if you pretend you're not doing that. If Henry had openly picked a side there'd have been chaos.


You win or you die. Sometimes, when you get sufficiently powerful, you have no choice but to try for the crown. Harold was too powerful for any other ruler to have ever kept him alive; no medieval British monarch was ever usurped without dying suspiciously quickly afterwards. Theoretically, this could have happened. They could have abandoned their claims and gone off to be a monk somewhere, preferably very far away. But being king was fundamentally an extremely dangerous business, which is why the good ones took it extremely seriously. Once again, understanding where the real power lies, and not believing your own myth of being a chip off the old God, is crucial.


Have a higher purpose : be haughty, not naughty. This one I have to add myself. Most of your dealings should be transactional (more below), but if you can give yourself the air of a moral purpose, that can help set you up as something more than a mere mortal. This can mean denying your own followers from time to time, but the haughtiness of appearing above the petty material concerns can be very important in sustaining the belief that you're a little bit divine. 

For god's sake, though, don't go nuts with this. Do this well and people will respect you, but ignore their base desires completely and they'll despise you. William II generally got away with it by being pragmatic and competent, which was fine in that he didn't really care about the Church... but it was less fine that he didn't care about fathering an heir.

And you absolutely can't be a zealot. You can't let ideological purity get in the way of pragmatism as the hard left does :

While, in principle, all the various kinds of lefties claim that their main aim is to keep the Conservatives out of power, in practice many left-wing groupings reserve their greatest animus for each other... That's what the hard left does – but that's not the problem. The problems is that's all it does... focusing its ire on people it calls Tories but who are in fact fellow Labour supporters – just ones who are a bit more centrist, a bit more capitalist, frankly a bit more realistic.

A medieval king could go on Crusade but that so far as the leaders were concerned, religion was playing a distant second fiddle to ambition and a chance for glory. A good king should give the semblance of devout belief but never try to court the fanatics or put prayer before power.


Secure your heir and legacy. Don't question the succession process. That doesn't mean you can't designate a different heir to the most obvious candidate, but you have to work within the system. One ruler tried the half-baked idea of saying that only heirs conceived while they were king – rather than before they themselves ascended the throne – were legitimate, which didn't catch on. But you could usually still get a way with a fair bit of wiggle-room. Actually I was quite surprised at how flexible things could be : the typical view that it's the eldest male son was a relatively late concept in medieval sovereignty. 

So don't question the process, because otherwise you open a can of worms. It risks people Asking Questions like, "if we don't have to do it this way after all, why can't we do it that way ?", and that leads to chaos. You also need an heir as part of your duties as ruler, to help prevent a power struggle form occurring in your own lifetime. You definitely want to avoid would-be leaders scheming in advance (even if they only ever do so behind the scenes). No, if everyone knows where they stand as soon as possible, so much greater the chance of a stable reign and a smooth transfer to the next one.


Don't have favourites. Or at least, don't let personal feelings get in the way of political business. Edward II, says Mitchell, could have had as much sex with men as he wanted if he'd only kept Piers Gaviscon in the closet and not given him political power he neither deserved nor was suited to. Favouritism like this was what led to political strife : a good king had to be transactional, giving nobles who supported him positions of influence regardless of whether he personally liked them. Worse still was the case of favouritism with a regency period, which would lead to chaotic power struggles to control the heir. The result was the heir would grow up to be a little shit like Richard II or a moron like Henry VI.


Respect the social norms. Try not to innovate, because innovation leads to thinking, and thinking will lead to everyone thinking that the whole "kings" idea was just made up. If you have to do something new, and you will from time to time, present it as restoration, not novelty. People like things which already work, and trying to hearken back to an imagined golden age seems to tap at something deep in the psyche. 

This is not to say that you can't make use of innovations which do occur. Edward I, being somewhat despotic, was oddly fond of parliaments because he was able to use them to extract money. He made the system work to his own advantage, rather than trying to change it. When change happens, it's far better if you can guide the process and pretend it was like this all along : nothing's really changing, so no reason to doubt the divine right of kings or anything silly like that. 


Suppress doubt. Mitchell's number one point is that you have to stop people from wondering what might happen next. When they do that, they get ideas that maybe they can change what happens, and that leads to rebellion and ruin. In fact the paramount task of any good medieval monarch is to stop this happening. I'd say that if you only do two things as ruler, make it these : understand the source and limits of your power, and make sure everyone knows what's going to happen next.

That's where the importance of those transactional relationships comes in. You have to both bestow favours and riches on your supporters and deal harshly with traitors. This is a weak society you're dealing with, and the moment it loses confidence in the process is the moment all hell breaks loose. But this is not to say you should be cruel, exactly. In fact, harming innocents (like Richard III and the Princes in the Tower) is liable to make you massively unpopular. Not only are certain things simply morally unacceptable even in an age of widespread violence, but they also make you unpredictable. If you go around murdering innocents, why should anyone trust you ? Similarly, if you reward your favourites rather than your actual supporters, what's the point of anyone following you ? Being capricious won't help you at all.

Generally what you want is to be essentially fair and reciprocal, albeit by the standards of the time. That can mean chopping off heads or gouging out eyes when people rebel, and if you don't do this then all that will happen is more rebellion. Start being truly psychopathic about it and you're probably in real trouble, but if you don't follow the convention then people will lose all trust for you. Likewise, you want to avoid being bribable and controllable. You want to be broadly politically (not militarily) predictable, but not perfectly or precisely : if people know exactly what reward or punishment they'll get, they can start to manipulate you. You need to be your own person.


Conclusions

So that's how to rule medieval Britain. Know where your power comes from, be basically predictable, at least occasionally principled but generally transactional, treat the job seriously, and don't innovate more than you have to. Do all of these and you're likely to come out on top. Producing and designating an heir, and at least having some role in their education, are optional but useful extras.

David Mitchell's ideal medieval monarch, then, isn't exactly a nice bloke, but he's not a cunt either. Unlike George R. R. Martin's depiction, short-term cynicism represented a catastrophic failure of the system, not a fault in human nature. When the system was run well, it functioned coherently. It made sense.

Was it a nice system ? Oh hell no, of course not ! It was dreadful. It kept the peasants in insane working conditions, prevented reform, and allowed international warfare as more of an aspiration than a failure. "Come on guys, if we all chip in, I reckon we might just have enough money to invade France this year". But then, anyone expecting to find anything Utopian in the medieval system clearly hasn't read the brief :

I reckon that, as soon as anyone starts seriously believing a system of government is at bottom rooted in justice and loveliness, they've let their skeptical guard down and are inviting the unavoidably imperfect to descend into the downright hellish. The world has never been fair, and cannot be made fair, and claims that it can are foolish or dishonest. It can be made fairer and attempts to make it less fair can be resisted. Optimistic realists seek improvement, not perfection.

Which is exactly right. As he also points out, everyone hates centrists; people seem to want to believe in literal heroes and villains, right and wrong, and don't make much allowances for anything in the middle. Because you aren't clearly picking a side, the thinking goes, you must be one of them

And yet... from the deeply flawed medieval system, eventually something better emerged. It wasn't a clear, linear arc towards justice. It was deeply embedded in the process of a radical change in the entire world view, "the underlying truth of existence". Exactly how and why this happened is not something I would care to guess, but the fact is, social progress did occur. We weren't stuck in the medieval pit forever. Improvement is possible even without sudden revolutions. Not subscribing to the most extreme viewpoints in one's political tribe doesn't make one any the less determined for reform, and it certainly doesn't make anyone somehow a member of the opposite faction.

These compromises of principle in order not to upset people set the Church of England on its path. It is despised by many for this. It is deemed to be soft, lacking in intellectual and theological rigour, trying to please everyone. Proper convinced Christians, and indeed ethical people of any belief system, should, it is often proclaimed, be fearless about upsetting people in order to uphold their values. Maybe. But I reckon most of the people who genuinely have no fear of upsetting others don't just have no fear of it, they actively enjoy it.

I strongly agree with that one too. The moral purity brigade mainly act from a sense of entitled self-righteousness, a protest move rather than a struggle for real change. The perfect really is the enemy of the good, and sometimes, then as now, it could truly be a fatal one.

Finally, what did we get as the system improved ? Mitchell's answer is clear : Shakespeare. On people questioning his existence, he has this to say :

Who would want that to be true ? Rather than the actual truth ? Here's the actual truth : a man with a normal background and education, an impecunious member of the provincial bourgeoisie in a backward kingdom on a war-wracked island at the edge of civilisation, turned out to be the greatest writer, and possibly the greatest artist of any kind, who ever lived. So far. That might be the most life-affirming fact in the entire history of humanity. Sometimes it makes me want to cry with joy. It's such a celebration of what humans can be. To want the truth to be otherwise is an act of spite against the very sanctity of our species.

Which is a sentiment I thoroughly share

I don't agree, in the end, that the medieval rulers contributed nothing comparable to later leaders, even if things like Magna Carta were actually failures of the system rather than its end goals. I think that some of the above lessons in leadership are plenty relevant to the modern world. But more than that, to understand the medieval world view is fascinating not just in itself, but in understanding who we are as a species. Who we are when we have to deal with very different surroundings to our modern world. How we cope without mass communications, how we reason without huge swathes of statistics, what our intuition is without detailed data. What makes sense, on a base level, to the human brain, and why we still cling to some damn fool ideas today.

As for Shakespeare, I think geniuses of his calibre are something that happens almost regardless of the system we have in place. The challenge we should set ourselves is not "can we make more Shakespeares ?", because we can't : they happen or don't happen uncontrollably and regardless of circumstances. But we can ask whether our system is the best one to allow more normal people to make their best contributions. The medieval system was absolutely shit at doing that. The modern system is a staggering improvement – it isn't a different kind of bad, it's demonstrably, unimaginably better – but with its consumerism, bullshit jobs, pointless discrimination and myriad of other flaws, it's clear that we still have a long way to go. We, at least, actually value innovation. Maybe that gives us more hope than even the most skilful medieval king, who was, at core, just a thug in a shiny hat.


Saturday, 30 May 2026

Review : The Making Of The Middle Ages (II)

Welcome back to my review-summary of John Haywood's The Making Of The Middle Ages. Last time we looked at the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, as one does. In this concluding part, we need to look at what happened to a fragmented (and sometimes not so fragmented) Europe in the aftermath of its first superstate, especially Britain because it's my blog and I can if I want to. I'll finish with a look at some of the deeper structural changes that were happening, which are directly relevant to an awful lot more than just Dark Age European history.


3) What happened next ?

Haywood has a somewhat pointless comment that the term "Dark Ages" only really applies to Europe; as a European, I would take it for granted that European studies are first and foremost concerned with, well, Europe.

Across the continent, the complexities of the changes are far too complex to attempt a summary here. Broadly though, Haywood notes that the collapse of the Roman free trade area meant a reversion to a simpler existence; there was just no other way people could get by. But change was enormously inhomogeneous. For those at the top it could be a true catastrophe, with their whole lifestyles depending on the resources of an Empire which was, quite suddenly, not there. For those at the bottom it might not have made much difference : instead of farming on the estate of some local governor, they now found themselves... still farming. 

But it wasn't anything like this simple. Peasants were now without the protection of the army against a series of invasions; they could be both at once the most and least affected by the change (and Haywood needs a better lower-level description to explain this better). The elite didn't suffer in the same way everywhere. In a few places, as we've seen in other books, they could sometimes sustain their lifestyles long after Rome had faded into legend. The organs of administration sometimes survived locally, but not always; political change was extremely rapid, but social change – the basic beliefs and ways in which people ran their own lives – could be much slower and more varied. 

Barbarians might, for instance, find themselves living as pagans surrounded by people who had been Christian* for centuries. Different laws were enacted that gave different rights to different groups. On the short term there was a chaotic mixture of beliefs that led to hatred and massacres; on the longer term, toleration of pagans made them more susceptible to conversion. 

* Or rather, monotheistic. Jewish treatment was highly varied : the Khazar Khanate even had Jewish leadership.

And again, not everywhere, and not all in the same way. In Britain a deliberate decision not to destroy the sacred shrines and holy places of the locals allowed priests to rebrand them for a Christian age. In Scandinavia, with tremendous irony, the supposedly more peaceful and moral Christian religion was enforced by methods of such brutality that even HBO would shirk from depicting them, including forcing live venomous snakes inside the unfortunate pagans by means of red hot pokers. Quite how you manage to do this probably doesn't bear thinking about.

Oddly enough, the "let's be nice to everyone" approach actually worked out far more successfully in the end. Funny that.

Whether we should see the end of Rome as the lights going out or an oppressive chain being lifted is not a question that has a single valid answer. In some case it could be either, in others, not really one or the other. The warrior culture that often replaced it was different, but it could sometimes just be a different kind of nasty. While Rome wiped Carthage from the map, you can't really imagine even the nastiest Roman general just heading out at random and declaring, "Let us go against the people with whom God is angry" as one barbarian warlord did. 

Haywood's presentation of the people who filled the vacuum of Empire is nuanced : their art could be as sophisticated as anything Rome ever produced, their technical skills their equal (or superior, as in the case of the composite bow), but their politics... that could be primitive and shite. They had a sophisticated, highly developed society, but their warrior, honour-based culture all but made peace impossible. They were not the monsters of later Christian legend, but they absolutely could be barbaric.

In the south, maps here again help with understanding the stupendous advance of the Arab invasions. Here was a civilisation as aggressive, imperial, and sophisticated as Rome had been, and it faced all the same problems of monumental scale but at a speed of advance unprecedented in Roman history. Haywood essentially presents this as more a conversion than a conquest, with the early Caliphate fragmenting almost immediately because there was simply no way to sustain an empire this large that had arisen this quickly. 

Nonetheless, the map of Europe dominated by the Caliphate, Carolingian Empire, and Byzantium is fascinating : three centuries after the fall of the West, Europe was already dominated once more by vast power blocs. No simple narrative can be told here. As on the smaller scale of Britain, there is no one story to tell. Sometimes provinces fragmented into a multitude of miniature kingdoms, sometimes they were subsumed once again into massive empires. The end of the Pax Romana led eventually to modern Europe, but not at all in a straightforward way.

One particular instance exemplifies this. I was aware that the Magyar people moved into Hungary sometime during this period, but I had absolutely no idea that they essentially invaded all of Europe. Virtually the entirety of the continent, except Britain, and this is the first I've heard of it ! It's like someone had conspired to hide the existence of the Vikings from me... I find it properly bizarre that we've forgotten this*. Granted, they were raids rather than an invasion proper, and short-lived. It just goes to show the power of simplifying the narrative, I guess.

* Its's not just me, right ?


4) What about Britain ?

There's a second outstanding point where I feel like a owe Haywood a beer. It's incredibly well-known in British popular history that Rome abandoned us due to a lack of resources; the famous letter sent by the Emperor in 410 AD instructing the British to "look to your own defences" is widely touted as categorical proof for this version of events.

So I was very much caught off-guard by Haywood's repeated assertions that it was Britain who left Rome, not the other way around. I felt sure this must be another of his more dubious throwaway claims, because why would so many popular historians insist so strongly, and so clearly, that this is undoubtedly what happened ?

But apparently... it isn't so straightforward as that. The text of the famous letter hasn't survived, only a reference to it in another document which in context doesn't even refer to Britain at all. I consulted ChatGPT about this and (checking the citation links) got somewhat mixed messages. Haywood's blunt assertion that we decided to leave and even expel the Romans looks to be heavily overstating the case, but it's by no means a unique view among historians. It still feels to me more plausible that Roman rule collapsed in Britain rather than being the result of local dissatisfaction; I find this earliest possible Brexit hard to swallow. Even so, learning how unreliable the letter is as evidence is very much like having the rug pulled from under one's feet.

More securely, all these maps of the enormous scale of mass migration and conquest across Europe do help – in another case of "show, don't tell" – why scholars of previous eras were so keen to believe the scant historical records of genocide in Britain by the Anglo-Saxons. Vast migrations really were a thing on the mainland, and when you chart this, when you see all those arrows drawn across the land (other books lack this context), it becomes much more difficult to believe that Britain alone could be such an outlier. Previous scholars might have been biased and had their own agendas, but we do them a disservice to attribute their beliefs solely to their prejudices. They weren't stupid.

Haywood nonetheless favours a mixed model, which I think is by far the most likely set of events. In some cases there may have been local massacres, in others a purely cultural change (essentially ideas spreading as a social contagion), in others an "elite transfer" where only the rulers were replaced. Thomas Williams presents much the most convincing argument for this, with the evolution and development of subsequent British minor kingdoms being so varied that the simplistic "the Saxons killed everybody" or "the Saxons never even showed up" interpretations both now look faintly preposterous.

Here Haywood feels in much better agreement with my other recent reads on Dark Age British history. He favours a somewhat later Christian conversion than others, pushing the final end of native paganism more towards 700 AD than Ronald Hutton thinks likely but still well within error bars. He also treats Ambrosius Aurelianus as a perfectly credible figure behind the myth of Arthur, something that Max Adams mentions but rejects without explanation despite their obvious similarities.


Conclusions : Networks and Hierarchies

Haywood does an excellent job of considering how the multitude of different polities in Dark Age Europe functioned as organisational systems. He considers both the economic forces governing them but also their religious and political ideals : the deliberate choices their leaders made, for good and ill, in a conscious effort to shape their own realities. Nobody here is purely a victim of circumstance nor wholly immune to forces beyond their control. Rulers shape their world just as much as they are shaped by it.

But one important system-level process which emerges repeatedly here is whether a state is a network or a hierarchy. Niall Ferguson considered this in his dedicated but somewhat hit-and-miss book The Square And The Tower, but I think Haywood helps clarify things. Broadly, a centralised state can marshall immense, well-coordinated resources : its military force can be highly destructive and highly targeted. This presumes, of course, that the state is well run (such that it really is a hierarchy, not just the semblance of one) and its ruler(s) intelligent. Depending on the details it can be slow to assemble its forces. A centralised administration can also be vulnerable to decapitation : kill the leader and you get to claim the whole empire.

By contrast, more egalitarian networks tend to be less coordinated. They can respond to local problems extremely rapidly, but find it difficult to assemble organised, large-scale invasion forces. They can be easy for a centralised state to raid but extremely hard to fully conquer, since each individual town and village is essentially an independent unit : there's no single person you can replace as ruler. You have to take them all one at a time.

These are only ever rough guidelines though. Centralised Lombardy, says Haywood, was much easier for Charlemagne to conquer than the more egalitarian Saxony, and similarly decentralised Ireland was a much tougher nut to crack for the Vikings than the poorly-run but centralised kingdoms of England. Conversely, the Viking decentralised network was extraordinarily effective during its invasion phase, but it lost all unity after England was (mostly) conquered. This made it disproportionately vulnerable to the disciplined, centralised, resurgent Wessex.

All this points to Ferguson's claim that networks tend to beat hierarchies as needing a lot of qualification. A group of disconnected villages is not a true network, any more than a centralised state where nobody actually cares what the ruler thinks is really a hierarchy. You don't necessarily need a ruler to be successful, but you do need coordination and communication. Once this is lost, once the network loses common purpose, it collapses into tiny, vulnerable fragments. Restoring unity may be much more difficult than replacing a failed leader in a hierarchy.

What eventually emerged from the wreck of Rome was a compromise : feudalism. This is essentially a decentralised hierarchy, or a sort of coordinated series of hierarchies. Yes, the king supposedly has the last say, but the power of medieval monarchs was very far from absolute. His immediate underlings often had wealth and armies of comparable power to his own, with a power base residing at significant distances from the royal court. And similarly for the dukes and earls and suchlike : centrally concentrated power with a clear sense of who the ruler was, but with their own agents – barons and counts and other lesser nobles – widely dispersed within their own provinces, and each having their own forces.

Which underscores two things. First, it's important to understand the actual structure of a network in practise, as opposed to its theoretical organisation. Second, that the network/hierarchy distinction is subtle, perhaps more subtle than centralised = hierarchy or decentralised = network.  

Max Adams also considered if kingdoms raised their kings or it was kings who raised kingdoms. That is, did a feudal structure emerge by itself, eventually resulting in centralised rulers, or did powerful warlords clobber their opponents and eventually enact feudalism ? This probably can't be satisfactorily answered, though a theoretical, sociological approach to understanding the currents of history sounds like a thoroughly good idea to me.

Two final practical points. There's an interesting parallel between the Merovingian kings, the later stages of the Roman Empire, and the early medieval Welsh. How so ? Well, just as the Romans sought to break into several self-governing units but maintain a single polity, so the Merovingian kings actually managed this for a time. You could point to a map of France and say this ruler controls this part, this one that, but all are Merovingian : again, a sort of decentralised hierarchy. And they in turn had inheritance laws which distributed their wealth somewhat equally among their children, a far more egalitarian approach than most European kings and strikingly similar to that of the Welsh. Understanding how this worked in detail, I think, is another area which requires a thoroughly holistic approach, and probably a purely network-based analysis is doomed to fail.

And this "consider ALL the things !" approach goes further. Last time I mentioned that you really have to consider systems in their entirety before reaching general conclusions. Selecting a single important aspect to say "look, this happened before, so if it repeats, this other thing is likely to happen as well" is a valid starting point, but it can't be the end of the analysis. Factors which can seem extraneous can be anything but, and one of the strangest examples of this is the nature of medieval scholarship. The interesting thing here is that medieval scholars were concerned with cultivating different ways of thought, teaching how to think more than what to think... but paradoxically, this didn't result in many novel ideas. Other authors certainly disagree with this, but still it's worth considering : in progressive circles, we so often take it for granted that teaching how is more important than what, but if we really want more creativity, perhaps there's more to it than that.

Finally, if rulers were both shaped by but also shaped their own environment, then the importance of long-term thinking becomes apparent. The institutional reforms of Heraclius (especially in terms of who could own what) didn't work in the short term, albeit because of the Arabian storm that would sweep away much of the battered Empire in a few short years. But they did save the foundations. His reforms led the way for a comeback : if not to anything like the old Roman state, then to a nation that would be in the top rank of European powers for centuries to come. 

Failure is indeed not fatal... but success is equally not final. Perhaps a greater understanding of the structures of our own age would better help us make sense of the confusing omnishambles in which we find ourselves, but mere data alone is not enough to convey understanding. And in the end, nothing lasts forever.

Wednesday, 27 May 2026

Review : The Making the Middle Ages (I)

I picked up John Haywood's The Making Of The Middle Ages : An Atlas of Europe as a treat to myself for no particular reason at all. I'm pleased to say that once again, Thames & Hudson do not disappoint. Physically, this is an exceptional product of thick paper, outstanding print quality, more than enough maps that the "Atlas" subtitle is fully earned, and accompanied by insightful, analytical text that attempts to draw out the large-scale trends driving Europe in the period c.400 – 1000 A.D.

I have two small complaints about the text. First, there are a few throwaway comments that appear to be pure bunk. Nothing very substantial*, but it does distract somewhat. Second, the balance is a little off, concentrating a bit more on the Fall of the Roman Empire than in the actual birth of European nations : an extra fifty pages here would have solved this nicely.

* One is that Marcus Aurelius inexplicably broke a tradition of emperors appointing successors meritocratically rather than dynastically, which simply isn't true at all. Another is that Britain in the Dark Ages was indeed a grim, dark place, which is massive oversimplification at best. A third, more serious accusation is that the Vikings were purely piratical, but for that one, wait for the post(s) on Neil Price's PhD thesis.

Against this, the maps are outstanding. They are not just there for eye candy, but significantly enhance the text itself : at a glance, the points that Haywood describes become clear, and trends that are complex to present in text become obvious in map form. A further compensation is that Haywood takes a much more economic, materialistic approach to history than most popular historians. He looks for the reasons driving the shifting demographics and political boundaries beyond the personal choices made by the great and good, without neglecting the importance of individuals during pivotal moments.

The only logistical issue I can raise is that it would have been extremely helpful to have a more detailed contents with a full list of maps. A better epilogue with a more thorough synthesis of the broad narrative and conclusions would also have boosted this from the "excellent" to "truly outstanding" category. As it stands, I'd probably give it... 8.5/10. Not too shabby, that.

I doubt every piece of analysis here will survive the judgement of history, and nor should it. These kinds of theories are offerings, suggestions to be made for examination, not pronouncements about what really happened. Plenty of them, though, seem very good indeed. So let's dive into what makes this such an interesting read.


1) The Non-Decline Of The Roman Empire

Haywood's interpretation of the late stages of the Roman Empire is very different from the classical, "collapsing morality and deplorable loss of manly virtues" of Gibbon and other antiquarians. The Roman state, by the start of the fifth century, would not have been much recognisable to Julius Caesar, but only in the same way that modern Britain wouldn't be familiar to Henry VIII. The original J.C., had he found himself thrown forwards into the worlds of Stilicho and Aetius, would have had a lot of radical unfamiliarity and a monstrous dose of culture shock to deal with... but if he'd persevered, he'd have been able to understand the lineage. He's have been able to say, "yep, this isn't the Empire of my day, but it's still definitely the Roman Empire".

The crucial point here is that, as in earlier times, the organisations and systems of the later Empire fundamentally worked. The structural changes which had occurred were basically sensible, necessary, and beneficial, and the Empire remained an unquestionable superpower; Haywood is excellent at stressing all this in a way that's sometimes obscured in other histories. But this is not to say that things were optimal... far from it. 

The Empire had reached the innate limits of its maximum extent. For one thing, communication delays alone made further expansion hugely impractical, but worse was that the grandeur of the imperial throne – the allure of pretensions to world rule – made it chronically unstable. It might well have been possible to devise a better system of government and succession, but whether one could have actually been implemented is another matter entirely.  

So things were functioning, and showing no obvious signs of collapse : the underlying problems the Empire faced were real but subtle. Past historians were too unkind to say it was all corruption, incompetence and cowardice, but there really was something rotten in the state of Roman Europe. To understand what was going on will take a bit of explaining, so bear with me for a little while.

One of the best cases of "show, don't tell" in the book is the series of maps showing the Third Century Crisis and the Tetrarchy. Something that comes across very quickly in any reading of Roman history is just how unstable the Empire really was : in its ~500 years of development, the heartlands were truly secure for perhaps one century out of that. The rest of the time it was constantly being split apart and reformed by rebellious governors, seceding provinces, and the occasional invader. But what the maps here show is just how similar the temporary fragmentation was in both the Crisis and the Tetrarchy; quite possibly, as though one directly inspired the other. The four political blocs the Empire broke into are not quite the same in each case, but they're of such similar size and number that it's impossible to believe they're unconnected.

On paper, then, the Tetrarchy was a decent plan, aiming to maintain the Empire as a very real polity without making the thing an ungovernable, bloated monster; more a federation of mini-Empires than one gigantic behemoth. It would also, I suppose allow aspiring Emperors a career trajectory which would satisfy their ambitions without burdening them with the superhuman demands of running the whole thing. It might have worked (after all, the Empire had already naturally split along such lines of its own accord), had the system had enough time to make this a cultural norm rather than being immediately undone by the phenomenally energetic and ambitious Constantine.

But there were more basic economic problems which the Empire had to grapple with beyond political management. What Rome was essentially trying to do, post-Hadrian, was essentially a Utopian dream : a stable, self-sufficient system, relying primarily (though not entirely) on its own internal resources. This meant abandoning the idea not only of imperial expansion – it simply couldn't expand any further – but also of economic growth. Indeed, limiting expansion now put the Empire, if anything, on a reduced budget rather than merely on a fixed income. The only real way to increase growth with first millennium technology, says Haywood, was to increase population : without conquest, population growth ceased, and windfalls from ravaging the barbarians dried up completely.

But to give Rome its due, it actually managed to adapt to this remarkably well. Its reorganised army – substantially larger than during its expansionist phase – consisting of border garrisons and mobile field armies behind the lines was able to handle barbarian raids very effectively, for the most part. The larger army demanded higher taxes, but most of these were paid in kind (not cash) so the effect on the economy was significant but not crippling. Even incorporating the migrating barbarians into its own military was generally successful.

There were two other major factors which proved much more difficult to address. One was that the reorganised Empire become essentially a theocracy with extremely strong state control. Your taxes might not be unbearable but you absolutely had to pay them. This was a profoundly illiberal and hierarchical society which was definitely Not A Nice Place To Live. Survival without economic growth meant iron fiscal and social self-discipline. During economic growth, the Empire could reward its citizens; when it flatlined, it became more oppressive, demanding more of its citizens than it gave back in return. For the ordinary person, there was far less of the glory that was Rome and far more of the grudgingly-paid taxes that was Rome. Consequently, they weren't especially likely to rise up in support should some invader come knocking at the gates.

Worse, and related, it was stagnant*. Of technological development, which could have given economic growth, there was naught, nor were there any fiscal innovations beyond "adjust taxes". If the Empire's moral corruption and slide into decay probably owes more to Gibbonish rhetoric than reality, then it seems that it certainly didn't do anything for its own self-improvement either. It may not have been declining, but it certainly wasn't progressing.

* Haywood says several times, without any justification or explanation whatsoever, that it was a period of chronic population decline. This is something of an annoyance because he leans on this quite heavily, but on the face of it it seems unlikely.

My reading of Haywood on this point is that this is a significantly more nuanced version than that of Gibbon. In Gibbon's thundering yet ponderous rhetoric, the Empire became corrupt and decadent because its rule was given over to people who were just worse than their illustrious forebears, out of some tired cliché that everything just entropically decays over time. Haywood's version does away with the stupid fallacy that the rulers were "just worse people", explaining that yes, there was corruption, but the systems were reformed for very good reasons. The rot in the state of Rome was not so much morally decadent leadership as it was economic pressure and a lack of ability to innovate. It was politically and technologically stagnant, and economically on a slow but irresistible decline.


2) The Fall Of Rome

Stagnation played a real role in the Empire's eventual collapse, and in this sense, internal problems were not entirely an invention of Gibbon's fertile imagination. The wealthiest, says Haywood, could indeed escape taxation through bribery and corruption, while the poorest had no choice but to pay up. The economic basis of the empire was attacked to sustain its elite; it was, in a very real sense, eating itself. The topical nature of this particular bit of commentary would seem to be self-evident.

As of course is the stuff on immigration, with Haywood describing here a very interesting feedback loop. The Empire never achieved true self-sufficiency and economic independence, and its reliance on external economies was nowhere more apparent than along its vast borders. The highly developed artisans and workshops of Rome produced luxury goods that were a magnet to external barbarians (even when they weren't being pushed onwards by warring tribes behind them), who in turn supplied the Empire with food. The problem was that this meant the barbarians were increasingly Romanised without being incorporated : the wealth of the border regions encouraged migration there and thus, without allowing them citizenship, the result was inevitably raiding and incursions. Rome was experiencing a serious crisis of short-term thinking, its own economic gains coming at the cost of strengthening its enemies.

Ultimately, Haywood basically agrees with Peter Heather. The final Fall wasn't due to a systemic problem, even if that system was flawed and did need overhaul. It was more a case of being simply overwhelmed : Rome just did not have the resources to deal with the scale of the threats it now faced. Where I think he does need to strengthen his argument, however, is in the statistics... Haywood presents the barbarian forces as so outnumbered by the Romans that it becomes a wonder they ever achieved anything. A fuller, even more economic analysis of where the tax revenues of Rome actually went might not be as enthralling as the the last, desperate victories against the Huns, but it might be more illuminating.

Still, Haywood's maps charting the collapse are an outstanding resource. At a stroke, the scale of the problem becomes obvious. Roughly speaking, the end took about a generation. There isn't really a clear moment you can say "this was the day the western Empire fell", but the classical date of 476 AD isn't a bad one. 

What isn't evident from the maps alone – and perhaps what led to complacency – is why this time things were different. The initial territorial losses are clearly substantial and problematic, but not on a scale the Empire hadn't experienced before. The accompanying data and interpretation help explain what had changed. Rome's vassal kingdoms might not have seemed all that much of a deal in terms of pure territory, but they were kept subservient out of fear and respect. Once that was gone, once they realised that Rome was now a paper tiger, the final institutional collapse came very quickly. It was by no means a total breakdown of society, with some local institutions surviving longer after the central administration was lost, but the idea of Rome as a polity was ended.

Nor could it be revived. Justinian's reconquests were as economically unsustainable as the western Empire itself had become – in fact the situation was very much worse. The damage done to Italy meant that it was held by the east* as a fife by sheer military end economic force. For any armchair generals wondering if Rome could have been restored to its full glory through, say, better support of Belisarius, the answer must be a firm "no". The resources needed for this did not exist, nor could the conquest have become a self-sustaining process.

* Haywood has a nice comment that we probably can point to a clear moment when the eastern Roman Empire truly became the Byzantine Empire : the reign of Heraclius. At this point, sweeping institutional reforms, though much needed, were so radical that it became a genuinely different entity. Up until then, the east survived as very much a direct, natural evolution of its predecessor; it was indeed still the Roman Empire despite the loss of Rome. After this point it was something new, more an heir to Rome rather than its literal continuation.

There's important, much more general lessons in cherry-picking here. Sometimes people decry claims that "this time it'll be different" as a sort of fallacy. And indeed, looked at in some narrow ways, such as purely through maps, situations can appear remarkably similar, such that claiming any real differences can seem foolish. Haywood shows how this is dangerous, that while some data can be a useful guide, you have to consider the situation in its entirety. So if you want to claim that, say technological advancements won't put people out of work (or indeed the opposite), you might be right, but you can't limit your study to how previous changes enfolded – no matter how similar they might appear. You can't draw a correlation without looking at all the extraneous circumstances, examining all of the context in which previous changes happened.




Phew ! So Rome did decline, albeit more slowly than sometimes described, and the decline by itself wasn't inevitably leading to collapse. It could have been arrested, but lacked the innovation and boldness needed to do so. The east managed it, reverting from a near-total collapse into a powerful European state that kept going (albeit with varying degrees of success) for another thousand years. In the concluding part, we'll look a bit more into this, as well as how the rest of Europe fared (especially Britain), as well as considering the underlying systems at work in more detail

Saturday, 18 April 2026

Review : Galileo's Daughter (II)

Welcome back to the concluding part of my review-summary of Dava Sobel's Galileo's Daughter. In part one I covered how Galileo was a prodigious polymath, something which often gets lost in the simplified "he was imprisoned for teaching that the Sun goes around the Earth" version of events. I also looked briefly at Galileo as a man, ending with how for him, the idea of a conflict between natural inquiry and holy doctrine barely made sense. 

In this second part, I'll begin with these now largely estranged viewpoints didn't pose a problem for Galileo's own philosophy, but then how this came into such prominent conflict with the Church. I'll end with a look at whether Sobel's own interpretation – that the problem was not one of a clash of world views – is really correct.


3) Galileo the Philosopher

Galileo, says Sobel, believed that God revealed truths through two books. One of these was Holy Scripture, which could never be wrong, but could be misinterpreted and wasn't intended to be taken literally. The second was nature itself, "this grand book the Universe". Observation was truth and could never be wrong. Where the two appeared in conflict, ultimately nature must prevail, and scripture recognised to be symbolic :

"Holy Scripture and Nature are both emanations from the divine word : the former dictated by the Holy Spirit, the latter the observant executrix of God's commands."

Key here is that while Galileo might be somewhat morally flexible, he really seems to have believed this. Nor was this an unusual or even unorthodox view. While Galileo himself popularised the famous quote that the Bible tells us how to go to heaven, not how the heavens go... the original source was no less than a Cardinal ! Indeed, the book is replete with high-ranking Church officials endorsing Galileo's work with some enthusiasm, and until the moment of the publication of the famous Dialogue, it would be hard to see him as being anything other than on the best of terms with the Church fathers. 

Not everyone, it's true, was a fan, but the overwhelming nature of his detractors appears to have been one of envy. There might be a smattering of religious fanaticism here and there, but Galileo himself dismissed this as mere "pretended religion", a means to an end, not a sincere belief at all.

This view of nature as the work of God led to a total rejection of the idea of intelligent design. He offers an argument for accepting uncertainty and rejecting the exalted status of mankind which is at once both theological and scientific :

"When I am told that an immense space interposed between the planetary orbits and the starry sphere would be useless and vain, being idle and devoid of stars, and that any immensity going beyond our comprehension would be superfluous for holding the fixed stars, I say that it is brash for our feebleness to attempt to judge the reason for God's actions, and to call everything in the universe vain and superfluous which does not serve us."

In other words, we might not understand why or how God operates, but that damn well doesn't mean we can't observe the world he's made, or reject it because it disagrees with our ideas about how it should be. He continues :

"I believe that one of the greatest pieces of arrogance, or rather madness, that can be thought of is to say, 'Since I do not know how Jupiter or Saturn is of service to me, they are superfluous, and even do not exist*'. Because, o deluded man, neither do I know how my arteries are of service to me, nor my cartilages, spleen or gall; I should not even know that I had a gall, or a spleen, or kidneys, if they had not been shown to me in many dissected corpses."

* While the majority response seems to have been one of awe, a few people had indeed refused to even look through Galileo's telescope. 

Practically minded as he was, he was also thinking of the philosophical implications of what he was doing and his methodology. While he was clear that experiment and observation had the last word, he used thought experiments as guides. For example, when considering whether heavier objects fall faster, he imagined two objects merging in mid-fall to ask whether their speed would then spontaneously increase. Although the notion of gravity evaded him, he at least considered the basis of relative motion, imagining that if you dropped a ball when pulled along on a moving platform, the ball would still keep moving forwards as it fell. In understanding why 45 degrees was the optimum angle to maximise the range of a projectile, he wrote :

"To understand why this happens far outweighs the mere information obtained by the testimony of others or even by repeated experiment."

I like this argument very much. When you understand the reason for something, you can predict what will happen in new situations. You've gained a fundamental insight into how the world works, even, in sense, a measure of control over it. Pure data collection and observation are sometimes an underrated part of the scientific process (likened unflatteringly to stamp collecting), but ultimately this kind of understanding is the nugget of shining gold we're all searching for. This is the epitomy of the scientific endeavour, not to merely quantify the world, but to understand it at the deepest level the human mind allows.

Galileo even came up with an argument that would presage Wigner by several centuries, recognising that the Universe did indeed follow mathematical laws – in sharp contradiction to Aristotle's silly view that the world was just more complicated than that :

"Just as the accountant who wants his calculations to deal with sugar, silk and wool must discount the boxes, bales, and other packings, so the mathematical scientist, when he wants to recognise in the concrete the effects he has proved in the abstract, must deduct any material hinderances; and if he is able to do that, I assure you that things are in no less agreement than are arithmetical computations. The trouble lies, then, not in abstractness or concreteness, but with the accountant who does not know how to balance his books."

Here was a true, practical philosopher*. He saw no contradiction between science and religion and indeed saw his work as revealing the glory of god : "To imagine an infinite universe was merely to grant almighty God his proper due". There were, of course, those who disagreed. Some did so out of envy and jealously, some out of sheer stupidity. And one, in particular, seems to have done so, if we have to reduce it to a single cause, out of an insistence on authoritarian control. Belief in a deity itself was never the cause of the strife, but the need to assert power over others has an awful lot to answer for.

* What's especially fascinating to me is how some other philosophical arguments of this and earlier eras are incredibly sophisticated, yet the practical, natural philosophy remained stuck in an age of astonishing stupidity. This is quite the reverse of the common tendency to proclaim that our intellect gets ahead of our morality. Maybe this is true today, but for the longest time, our practical understanding was incredibly slight and completely outpaced by moral philosophy – if not by how we actually treated each other in reality.


4) Galileo the Criminal

Pope Urban VIII was a cunt. He wasn't the only cunt, and he didn't start out being such a cunt, and he certainly wasn't one of the stupid cunts like what we have nowadays, but nevertheless, he had a nasty, vindictive streak, was thin-skinned, and didn't like to back down in the face of a challenge. He was, I say again, a cunt.

Galileo had a tendency to sail close to the wind, to push the boundaries of what the Church would allow. He also had a healthy fear of being ostracised, and in the face of censure and censorship, he usually backed down. He consistently tried very hard, however, to pre-empt this, discussing his ideas with high-ranking members of the clergy before publishing them and always (until the very end) doing everything through the proper channels. He was personally friends with many high-ranking members of the Church, most of whom praised him for his wonderful discoveries of all kinds, and on good terms with the Pope himself. So how did it all go so suddenly and catastrophically wrong ?

The initial dispute in 1616 was relatively mild. Heliocentrism wasn't deemed heretical, but the Church required it to be discussed as a hypothesis, not fact. The Church, in the wake of the Reformation, was not feeling terribly secure, but Galileo was given personal assurances that his minor infraction hadn't damaged his high standing : he just had to be a bit more careful in the future, but everyone still thought he was the bee's knees.

More problematic was the business of interpreting the Bible. The problem with not taking Scripture as literal truth meant that both sides argued with each other as to whose interpretation was correct, and worse, who got to interpret the interpretations. The Church was moving in a direction of declaring itself the sole authority as to who was allowed to do this, which made Galileo's personal attempts at theology dangerous. Galileo, in contrast, was seeking to save the Church from itself, knowing that while the evidence for heliocentrism was not yet irrefutable – arguments were genuinely lacking, especially a theory of gravity for how it would all work – the time was coming when it would be proved with certainty, and to maintain denial would cause the Church to be ridiculed. People would, quite literally, lose faith.

But for the next 16 years or so, Galileo kept his work to himself and close colleagues. Only after much effort, seeking assurances from multiple clergy, and sending it through the Papal-approved publication censors and channels, did he submit a much more elaborate discussion. Initially, it was received with all the applause Galileo was accustomed to. Only when Pope Urban got wind of it did things go very quickly south.

What seems to have happened was a confluence of factors all making the Pope more of a cunt than usual. As well as the Reformation, he was feeling personally insecure due to accusations of not defending the faith with sufficient vigour. Galileo's detractors, recognising the early censure* of heliocentrism, sensed a chance to bring him low, and they seized upon it in full force. The Pope never read the 500 pages himself – all he heard was the filtered version from Galileo's enemies.

* With just two very small amendments and insertions required by the Church, the stronger term of "censorship" hardly seems appropriate. This was scarcely more than the actions of modern-day broadcast regulators, albeit applied to an arena which is out of bounds to the Inquisition's modern-day counterparts.

What the Pope heard was partly correct and partly an egregious distortion. It was true that Galileo was openly supporting heliocentrism as fact, not hypothesis. Technically he had fully complied with all the directives, but in practise, nobody reading it would ever come away with the impression the geocentrism remained a valid theory. At his trial, he bowed completely to the pressure – there was never any famous "and yet it moves !" defiance from a by now frail old man – and pretended that he actually fully believed in the Ptolemaic model, saying that maybe he'd once considered heliocentrism an interesting alternative but no more than that. He maintained that his work was not intended to promote the heliocentric model in any way. He presented a document that he believed gave him full license to consider it hypothetically, but none of this was enough to satisfy the more belligerent Inquisitors (although only 7/10 signed the final verdict) or the Pope himself... who was, of course, a cunt.

Why do I labour this point ? Because Urban never even read the document, yet doubled down on his wrath. He eventually had Galileo moved, not out of kindness so he could be closer to his daughter, but because his ostensible gaolkeeper was actually treating him as more of an honoured guest, receiving many visitors for scientific discussions. Far worse, Urban had all of his existing (and future) works banned from further printing : a wholly mean-spirited and petty thing to do, an action of pure spite given that half of Europe had already read them. 

The part that seemed to personally wind him up was that Galileo had used some of his favourite arguments to favour heliocentrism... or at least, this is how things are usually described, but really this is a bit too simple. The fuller version is more subtle.

In an earlier essay, Galileo had written an analogy that was pleasing to both scientist and theologian alike, a story of a man who goes around looking to understand the various ways in which animals produce sounds. He learns a great deal, but eventually finds one which doesn't fit any of theories, so realising that the omnipotence of God is greater than he can imagine. Man can learn much, the fictional investigator realises, but the full wonders of the Universe are beyond human comprehension. 

This argument "delighted Urban", and so Galileo used it in the dialogue (as he was instructed to do) for the debater who prefers geocentrism. At the end, he concedes that the magnificence of God is such that he might be wrong, and that God might indeed allow a heliocentric universe. Together with the others conceding that they cannot offer certain proof of heliocentrism, this was enough for the document to pass muster for publication. It all feels very delicate and respectable, and not at all the case of "Galileo made fun of the Pope" which even today is how it's written in some popular descriptions. Rather it seems thoroughly intellectual and nuanced.

What marks Urban as a complete cunt is that he swallowed the argument that Galileo was mocking him without ever bothering to check. He was willing to fine him and sentence him to life imprisonment – Galileo was even threatened with torture – all on the basis of what other people said, despite having been on such personally good terms with the man until almost that very moment. He would have undone all his life's works without ever even trying to check if he was being fed the correct interpretation of what Galileo had actually written. Why he did this is, sadly, the missing piece of the argument, but the result, of course is history.


Conclusions

The censorship of the Catholic Church was indefensible by modern standards, but its importance has been massively exaggerated by New Atheists. Neither Galileo nor Copernicus (who was never branded a heretic) were seeking any conflict with the Church or to undermine religion, but they did have a different approach to theological inquiry. For them, studying the natural world revealed the handiwork of God and was literally incapable of contradiction with holy writ, with the Scriptures subject to human error and therefore subservient to observation. 

For those like Pope Urban, it was not quite that the situation was reversed. It was more that he believed that God was not bound even by human imagination, that God could, if he wanted, commit something logically inconsistent like creating a rock so heavy he couldn't lift it. Whereas Galileo might see God as bound to create things which were ordered and harmonious, Urban imposed no such restrictions.

Galileo also offered an argument of cosmic economics. Whereas the Ptolemaic system offered Earth an exalted central status, but at the same time made it degenerate and changeable, Galileo said that its rarity in the heavens – not its immutability or position – made it valuable. Morality and cosmology were linked, and so Galileo made clever arguments to overturn the Ptolemaic framework on this front too. But the weight of history was perhaps here against him, and worse was the Church's increasing zeal to control information.

And this, I think, is the really interesting discrepancy between Galileo and his detractors. It's not at all about science versus religion in the highest, abstract sense : belief in deities is orthogonal to belief in what those deities happen to do or what they require of humans, and says nothing in itself about how they chose to order the world. It might be fairer to compare science to academia and religions to the Church, human institutions pitted against one another rather than their ideals. And at the heart of it seems a strongly illiberal desire amongst the Church – not the religion – to dictate what is true. 

I always remember hearing a well-known scientific contrarian declare, for no real reason at all, that "at some point you've got to make a decision", that is, to declare what the answer is so that everyone else can move forward. For the scientific consensus this is exactly what you mustn't ever do. Consensus is only successfully forged from independent findings, and only achieves its strength precisely because everyone has worked so hard to pull it down and failed. The idea that anyone gets to decide what's True, to tell everyone else what they have to believe, is anathema to the whole project. 

As scientists, we can only offer evidence and arguments; as humans, we can certainly try and persuade because we think that believing the truth as we see it will be of benefit to others. What we cannot ever do is to Declare Truth. Once we decide on truth by authority, we have lost the path of righteous truth-seeking and fallen into a need for power. The need to control others, for them to believe specific things even when the alternatives are completely harmless... that's what was at work with Urban. That's, I think, the "one trial of Galileo" that was really going on beneath the surface accusations.

It's what we see today among many fanatics, both of religious ilk but also the weirder segments of the political ideologues. To brand all the religious as being unthinking dolts as the New Atheists would have it is to catastrophically miss the point : what we should be fighting against is not spiritual beliefs, but the the illiberal ideas that we must impose our ideas on everyone else, to control rather than convince, to declare rather than discuss. In this age where one political side appears to be degenerating into ever more incoherent fascist farce, maintaining this liberal view is increasingly difficult. But if we can't accept that other people are perfectly entitled to hold stupid but harmless beliefs, then what are we even struggling for ? 

The Mouse Dystopia

Here's a rather nice little video on Universe 25, a.k.a. the Mouse Utopia : This is something I've come across many times over the y...