A worked example in victim blaming

It's nice to know the West doesn't have a monopoly on being arseholes, isn't it ? No, it isn't. But in case you need a reminder, here's a piece in which the author - the so-called "Czech Defender of Rights" - seems to think that logical fallacies are something you should go out of way to cram as many in per sentence as possible.  

Whenever there are violent demonstrations in society, like now in the US or recently in France, the state must use violence against these perpetrators.

For starters, define "violence". Does property damage count as violence ? Why "must" the response always be more violence ?  A violent demonstration is not an open rebellion, and there is a necessary use for violence. See the suffragette movement, for example. You can't keep oppressing people and not expect them to fight back, that's just plain silly.

We see in the US that the police there was reluctant to act against looters and arsonists for fear that if they acted against them, they would have been accused of being racist. That is racism in reverse.

And that is ignoring that black people are treated with extreme violence in comparison with white criminals.

From the very beginning [of the refugee crisis] it was wrong that countries did not distinguish between economic migrants and people who escaped wars.

Yes ! Quite so. Let's stop calling refugees "migrants", right ? I'm sure that's what you're getting at.

If thirty-year-old men who should wage a war against evil in their country instead run away, that is wrong.

Umm, wait, no, that's not what...

 We can see that these are no refugees but simply people who want to have a better life.

Hang on Stan, you're doing it wron-

We cannot accept that an immigrant should come to this country and is given a flat and 20,000 euros.

 Christ on a bike. You're... accusing people who walk halfway across a continent of being lazy freeloaders ? What's wrong with you ? Fuck off Stan.

The Czechs are not racist or xenophobic. 

Yes, they are. Just as the Brits and Americans and French and Japanese and New Zealanders are all racist. Racism is everywhere, it's a matter of degree. To say that no-one in an entire country is xenophobic is completely and utterly barking mad.

They simply have had their experiences. 

Yes, their experiences of being racist to people they don't like.

The so called "excluded areas" in our country are not the result of the fact that their inhabitants are poor. Poor people do not destroy their flats, they do not throw rubbish out of their windows. 

Whut ?

There exist certain categories of people whom the Czechs refuse to live with. I read in the papers that a ministr visited an "excluded locality" and was shocked by what he saw. A minister is shocked by what many people see every day?

Whut ?

Social housing is not a problem of poverty. 

Whut ? Look, Stan, you're just not making any sense.

It is important to help poor people but then there are people who destroy the housing stock. The Roma must accept responsibility for their own behaviour, for their approach to work.

Right, so you're not racist, you just think it's okay to infer that the Roma are house-trashing lazy slobs. Okay then.

The Roma complain that they are refused jobs because they are Roma. The entrepreneurs are saying: "I will not employ you because you are a Roma and I know that a Roma will not come to work on Wednesday."

Did you know, there's a special word for making premature judgements about an individual based on their race ? Hmm, I wonder what it could be...

If Roma representatives guaranteed that this would not be happening, and if they persuaded their own people not to behave like this, the situation would be different. But that is not happening.

You want someone to defend their ethnic group based on the behaviour of individuals, and you're not a racist, eh ?

The majority society is being accused of being racist towards the Roma, but this is not true. The Roma have the same rights and duties as everyone else and their behaviour is not caused by poverty. Poor people do not throw rubbish out of the window and do not destroy their flats.

Let me see if I have this straight... you're saying that society isn't being racist towards the Roma when it behaves in an incredibly racist way towards them ? Righty-hoo then. Your defence appears to be, "it's not racism if it's true".

The office of the defender of rights under my leadership will get rid of activism. We will not be doing nonsensical research, we will not be sending activists anywhere. We will be reacting to people's problems about which they write to us.

Whut ?

I have had much contact with society. As a lawyer, defender of people who rent their flats, I have been to all the excluded localities, I have represented the Roma all over the Czech Republic, I went to various courts and defended Roma renters. No one should say I am against the Roma, that insults me. 

You... literally just called the Roma a bunch of lazy property-wrecking slobs, and you're the one feeling insulted ? That level of self-delusion is truly impressive.

Sigh.

Czech defender of rights: "The Roma don't work and are not a minority" | 13. 9. 2020 | Britské listy

13. 9. 2020 Whenever there are violent demonstrations in society, like now in the US or recently in France, the state must use violence against these perpetrators. If demonstrators start using violence, they must realise that the state will use violence against them.

If you can beat them, keep beating them ?

This is an interesting observation. Despite the left rarely and barely having any political clout in British politics, the right continuously acts as though the left have already won - or at least, as though their political position were far less secure than all the evidence suggests it actually is.

In the United Kingdom, the spectre of a Marxist takeover is also invoked across the rightwing spectrum, including the attorney general. Conservative commentators like to claim that the left in Britain “controls almost every institution”. What exactly is going on here?

“Control” cannot refer to the classical liberal notion of representative government: winning elections and forming governments... when it comes to political representation, the left in Britain has been in opposition for the best part of the last 100 years. Even in the few cases in which it succeeded in winning elections, it did so while relinquishing traditional leftwing commitments, promoting an image of itself as competent and pragmatic, neither right nor left.

The usual state of affairs in Britain seems to be to view the right as unlikable but competent and necessary while the left is well-meaning but ineffectual and misguided. Case in point : the Liberal Democrats. This isn't an absolute by any means, but it's a useful generalisation to keep in mind.

The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci coined the term “cultural hegemony”, by which he meant the capacity to exercise influence in society through educational institutions, the arts or the media. When the right claims that the “left is in control”, it is pulling a Gramscian move: they know the left has no political or economic power, but claim that it nonetheless pervades society and culture.

But to some degree I think it does; nothing cannot come of nothing. If I can make a totally unjustified anecdotal observation, most mainstream fiction does seem to have a left-liberal bias. Because how could you make a drama in which exclusion and intolerance were the order of the day ? You can't, because they never solve anything. When was the last time you saw a fictional fat cat trying to do what's right against the evil machinations of their downtrodden and poverty-stricken underlings ? You never did, because it would make for terrible, nonsensical television.

On the other hand you do see plenty of stories about fighting oppression, because absolutely everyone can get behind fighting oppression - be that a local bully, and evil corporation, or an authoritarian government. Perhaps Firefly comes to mind as a chilling vision of a left-wing dystopia or government "meddling" gone amok, but in general, everyone wants to be free both to act as they wish and free from other people stopping them from doing this. Everyone can agree the fictional Alliance in Firefly goes too far. Everyone can agree that some non-total level of freedom is a good thing. Everyone can agree that evil alien invaders are something you should fight against. Those black-and-white cases are easy, and largely transcend political boundaries. Nobody wants total government control. Nobody wants ungoverned anarchy. Well, anarchists do, but they don't count.

So perhaps I'm wrong in claiming that most fiction has a left-wing bias. Perhaps it just has a bias towards a universal, politically independent morality. When one of the evil aliens turns out to be good, who could stand up and say, "they should kill him anyway" ? Probably no-one. Nobody ever knowingly defends unfairness.

If that's so, then what would a genuinely left or right-leaning work of fiction actually look like ? We can perhaps glimpse it in the way that right-wing celebrities often play parts that the left would say espouse their own values. To the left, the orcs are the forces of intolerance; to the right, they're the EU or Muslims or something. To the left, the Rebel Alliance are an oppressed minority fighting against fascism; to the right, they're standing up for traditional (Old) Republican values and fighting against Communist tyranny. That's the gist of it, anyway. Doesn't have to be taken too literally or 100% accurate.

But if fiction can easily be interpreted to suit the viewer's inclinations, is there any charge at all in a left-liberal fiction bias ? Maybe. Diversity is an inherently leftward position. The right does value fairness, but it doesn't go out of its way to help the unfairly treated. The right, correctly or not, says that you should achieve success by yourself and not rely on anyone else to get you there. So diversity of race, age, gender etc. are all indicators of a left-leaning bias. When a fictional character argues for inclusivity of cultures, that is a left bias. Who would ever write a popular mainstream fiction of separate but equal and defend it as desirable ?

Despite the blog's title I do at least try to keep each post at least internally self-consistent. Here I'm on far less steady ground. I started with the view that yes of course most fiction is inherently left-leaning, but now I'm far less sure of that. Okay, there might be some inherent preference to it, but much less than I might have insisted upon at the start. Eye of the beholder, and all that - just as I'd ascribe values and behaviour to the right that they do not at least profess to hold. The right, surely, do not identify themselves as intolerant, unfair, ruthless and uncaring - that's my bias assigning them the values I see them upholding. Of course, the values they truly believe and uphold are another matter; there's not usually all that much wrong with the ones they claim to cherish.

(You'll have to excuse me for feeling intolerant today. There are honourable, sensible people on the political right, but it feels increasingly to me that the majority are hypocritical nutters. It's not their values - for the most part - that I have a problem with but their implementation. Sorry about that.)

This may explain how so much apparently left-leaning fiction can persist in a conservative society : everyone sees only what they want to see. No-one wants to see themselves as the villain. Fiction is inherently open to interpretation, so unless a moral message is absolutely explicit, it's rarely problematic to those who disagree.

But this means that the right's attempts to depict the left as an ungracious winner seem even stranger. Why bother to attack someone with much less (but not zero) political or cultural clout than yourself ?

For the right, those who question the legacy of the empire or making efforts to decolonise university curriculums have created a situation in which “the very underpinnings of western liberal democracies are being subverted and destroyed”. Instead of asking why so many of the songs we sing, roads we walk down and statues we pass contain traces of an injustice whose legacy continues to shape the present, Conservative MPs are urged to be “the vanguard” of the opposition to the left’s “remorseless cancel culture”.

It would be a formidable achievement for a left that has neither adequate political organisation (in both Britain and the US, the leading progressive parties, in opposition, are run by their centre or right factions) nor any kind of significant control over the economy to be culturally hegemonic. 

The fantasy of leftwing hegemony in rightwing countries is not about principles, but tactics... Cultural Marxists explained how narratives developed to ensure that those who would have reason to protest against a failing system ended up being co-opted, and how progressive struggles lost ground just when they seemed to have gained momentum. They emphasised that it was not enough to focus on material oppression; one must also understand forms of injustice based on discourse, symbols and culture, and learn from the conflicts they provoke.

When representative political institutions fail, and when the economic system faces its worst crisis since the Great Depression, the only way to secure compliance is to demonise leftwing alternatives.

Just as you should never trust a skinny chef, so no-one fears a poor thief. Thus it behooves the mainstream right to exaggerate the influence of the left and underplay their own success in going against a fearful opponent*. This may also explain why Americans can seem (to Europeans) incredibly insecure in their apparent own world domination. The apparent successes are at least partly illusory and depend more on belief than any more solid foundation. There is, in the right, perhaps a subconscious fear of the fragility of their own genuine achievements, that, for example, economic success has been achieved at the enormous cost of environmental sustainability; a guilt that their actions do not actually reach the high ethical standards they claim to value. After all, if they really thought things were going as well as they claim, they wouldn't need to shout about it so much. A case of "methinks they doth protest too much" writ large.

* A sort of weird variation on the straw man fallacy, in which the opponent is easy to disparage but in this case is depicted as having a whole array of dangerous weaponry they do not, in fact, have. I propose we call it the "Scarecrow" fallacy after the villain in Batman of the same name.

Why does the right keep pretending the left runs Britain? | Lea Ypi

ost of my students would struggle to name any "cultural Marxists". The work of social theorists such as Theodor Adorno, pioneer of the so-called cultural turn in post-war Marxist studies, is barely taught in humanities and social science departments these days.

Dune Version 2

Since Christopher Nolan has gone down the path of Being Hugely Annoying, can the other movie I was looking forward to this year bring some much-needed cinematic delight ? Maybe. I have a big soft spot for the original David Lynch version, very much a broken masterpiece as it is.

If you haven't see the film, the special effects on the restored blu-ray version aren't quite as bad as the YouTube trailer makes them appear. The sandworms are even passable, though a lot of the spaceship shots now look... odd.

The original, despite its many, many flaws, has a lot going for it. It has style. It has more style than you can shake a stick it. From a very creepy Kyle McLachlan to a furious Patrick Stewart charging into battle with a pug (yes, really), or the the baroque stylings of the ships (albeit sometimes on too low a budget) or, best of all, the feckin' awesome soundtrack, to my mind it captures the spirit of the book as well as anyone could ever hope.

"Dun, dun, dun-dun.... Dun, dun, dun-dun...." I mean, that's all the music needs to do, really. The whole thing reeks of mysticism. And it's deliciously dark, if sometimes very silly : e.g. the Sardukar troops wearing actual used body bags. It's not a crowd pleaser, and it damn well shouldn't be.

A friend of my once told me he thought the original has "nothing much" to do with the book. Well, I re-read the book earlier this year, and he's wrong. Most of the movie is a direct scene-by-scene (often word for word) extract of the book. In some ways - dammit - I will even say it makes slight improvements. The dark pantomiminess of the Harkonnens is more evident in the movie than the novel. The exclusion of Count Fenring (an imperial servant who has a long but essentially pointless sequence in the book), Harah (Paul's rather annoying first wife), the invented Guild Navigator sequence (presumably inspired by later novels) and the simplification of Paul and Jessica's escape from the Harkonnens are all well done. As are the frequent voice-overs of the character's thoughts, with so much of the book literally being about what people are thinking rather than what's happening.

One of the major problems of the movie is that it essentially shows all the important set pieces but lacks a consistent linkage to hold them all together. If you haven't read the book, it just doesn't make a lot of sense. It's too weird and unusual a universe to drop on an uninformed viewer and expect them to figure it out for themselves : the novel is complicated. It has subtext and history that's inevitably difficult to capture in a movie; lordly, it even comes with a damn dictionary.

And it does also muck around unnecessarily with the story : instead of developing better soldiers through inspiring fanatical loyalty, the Atreides get the easier option of Bene Gesserit-inspired weaponry; the ending of Paul making it rain is okay but nowhere near as satisfying as the more political version of the novel. Sometimes it's silly and cheap. It's not everyone's cup of tea, no doubt about that. I get why it's unpopular, but to me all of this is washed away by its dark flood of mystical baroque stylings.

"Dun, dun, dun-dun...." sorry, I'll stop now.

What about the latest offering from the director of Blade Runner 2049, which I liked very much ?

It's got potential. It's clearly a very different beast. It definitely doesn't have budget problems or look as though anyone will ever describe it as "cheap" or "silly". It's also appears faithful to the book, even if using "crusade" might be politically more acceptable today than "jihad", which frankly is a bit of a shame. Does it have mysticism ? Ye-es, but it's hard to tell exactly how well that will pan out. Clearly it's no so heavy-handed as the David Lynch film, which might well be an advantage. The music ? Well it's a trailer, and modern trailers have a habit of using different music from the film for some reason, so we probably shouldn't judge it there. The main characters also appear closer in age to the those in the novel (at the start, the novel's Paul even behaves quite childishly - he matures intellectually throughout the book, rather than being a fully-fledged Duke-in-waiting or potential messiah from the word go). And it's got wormsign the like of which even God has never seen, so there's that.

There's not much more than can be inferred from a trailer, so I won't. I shall cling to optimism with the voraciousness of the desperate, but this is 2020 so I expect the ending of the movie will feature a giant pink sandworm playing Scrabble or something. We'll see.

Review : Tenet

I should probably start by saying that I find Christopher Nolan extremely hit-and-miss as a director. I liked The Prestige, I loved Batman Begins, The Dark Knight, and Inception, but The Dark Knight Rises* was a broken masterpiece, Interstellar was a pile of well-rendered crap and Dunkirk was ultimately pointless.

* Sod off Robin, I want more Anne Hathaway in a leather catsuit.

Unfortunately I have to say that Tenet is in the latter category. In some ways it reminds me quite a lot of Ad Astra, which is going to sound bizarre so let me explain. Minor spoilers ahead.

First, the audio. The only Nolan film where I previously thought the audio was off was Interstellar, but then only occasionally and not for anything crucial. Contrary to other web denizens, I had exactly zero problems understanding Bane's voice in The Dark Knight Rises. It was hugely charismatic and basically perfect in every way. Here it is again, in case you've forgotten :

But for Tenet I have to agree with the Guardian :

There is a wonderful exchange in Christopher Nolan’s latest film, Tenet, between Robert Pattinson and John David Washington. “Hngmmhmmh,” says Pattinson. “Mmghh nmmhhmmmm nghhh,” replies Washington. Marvellous.

It’s hard to imagine that Nolan is unaware of the criticism. Price suspects the director wants to make the audience work harder to understand the dialogue; he thinks Nolan believes this will make the film a more immersive, engaging experience. But, Price says, “I think he is the only one in the world who believes that.”

The audio bothered me from the word go. With the opening scenes set in Ukraine, I thought I was just listening to Ukrainian (being in a Czech cinema, all the subtitles were in Czech). It took some considerable time before I could be certain they'd switched to English. Pretty soon I began wondering if they'd done any audio tests at all, because this kept going throughout the entire movie and never let up. I imagined myself sat in a sound test trying to write down what the actors were saying and pausing it every few seconds to say, "nope, sorry, didn't get a word of that. Let's try that bit again, Chris."

Probably I missed a good 20% of the dialogue. I got the gist of what was going on, but missed so many details that a lot of scenes simply didn't make any sense. And the rest of the time it was such a struggle to hear what was being said that I found it annoying and boring, not engaging.

It's not just the dialogue either : I'm gonna go full grumpy old man here, but dammit, the whole audio felt too loud. Sometimes I even suspected it would be easier to hear what was being said if they just turned it down a notch. At other times I felt that the constant hail of gunshots and explosions was just irritating, not exciting. I don't know if I'd quite say the audio was distorted, but it was close.

But it's the dialogue in the film which is more important. Since the plot is innately confusing, the audience needs information. Nolan did this masterfully in Inception, delivering a plot which could have been confusing as heck in such a way that it made perfect sense. Here he did the opposite. The plot is cleverly palindromic, but delivered in such a way as to be far more confusing than necessary. So not knowing why characters are doing certain things - or even what they're trying to do - isn't so much cutting down to the bone as it is into the bone so deeply that the film's leg falls off. It's a bit like having a film about the Spanish Armada but being no clue as to where the ships are going or what they're going to do when they get there.

And the movie does this in other ways too. It's got a plot, but nothing you could call a story. It's a sequence of set pieces with even less than the bare minimum of required linking explanatory scenes to hold them together. Now, that in itself isn't too bad; kudos for trying something different. But without crystal clear dialogue, trying to figure the damn thing out is tedious and annoying.

Here's where the comparison to Ad Astra comes in. The first half of the movie I did actually enjoy quite a lot. The action sequences are quite fun - the bit with the plane is something I've never seen before - and the plot and tone of the movie are at least self-consistent. Did I understand everything ? No, but I didn't feel I needed to. The on-screen experience stood for itself.

After that things got steadily worse, until by the end of the movie I just wanted the thing to be over.

The basic plot is that some people are trying to stop some other people in the future from destroying the world by reversing time. Midway through, our chief protagonists are "inverted", meaning they move backwards through time so we see quite a lot of the previous sequences in reverse. This is clever and well done. In the first half there's a distinct mystery element, and though it's hugely derivative (the temporal cold war is lifted straight out of Star Trek Enterprise; meeting people in reverse is the same Doctor Who / River Song plot; everything going backwards is taken straight from a Red Dwarf episode) it's also well done. It's a straightforward serious action sci-fi flick, no doubt about it.

After that, it doesn't seem to know what it wants to be. The world-destroying plotline is clearly epic, but it's delivered in an impressively humdrum way that gets ever-more cliched as the movie goes on. The "here it is in reverse" trick is played too often, the characters are so generic as to be utterly unengaging, the villain's reasoning for destroying the world far too obvious and boring. The rest of the characters are similarly dull at best - their motivations and emotions either unclear or cliched and two-dimensional. There's no tension, no sense of threat, no reason to care very much about anything that happens. 

Even the action sequences are, uniquely for a Nolan film, dull. Okay, Chris, you've done them full scale, but they're just not that impressive. The big car chase sequence doesn't hold a candle to the one in The Matrix Reloaded and the final end battle looks like it was taken from Call of Duty. It's nothing we haven't seen a million times before, with a hugely overused but underexploited time-travel gimmick thrown in for no reason. You could literally take the time travel out of the movie and tell the same basic story without any loss. In short, the movie misses its own point and doesn't quite know what sort of tale it wants to be.

They say it's one to see on the big screen, but I disagree. There's nothing spectacular enough here to benefit much from being on a big screen; the action sequences are too understated and underdeveloped. It's like the movie can't quite get over its own perceived novelty and is convinced audiences will be equally enthralled by its clever but useless gimmick.

In fact I thought quite often that this would be a better suited to a good ten-episode TV series. It needed a lot more time to develop the characters and their motivation, and just to explain just what the hell was happening. As it stands, it's a series of "this happened and then this happened and then there was an explosion and a really slow car chase and then this dude got an army from somewhere and someone died." The premise is clever, the execution was not. So tiring was it trying to follow what was going on that I completely zoned out during several key scenes (at the start, didn't even realise the whole audience had been gassed, and I don't even remember the final scene at all).

Overall then, I'm not impressed. I'd give the first half of the movie a solid 7/10, but falling to maybe 2/10 by the end, and 4/10 for the whole thing. I might change my mind if I watch it again on the small screen with subtitles, but we'll see.

U-turn if you want to, but only under certain conditions

Back when I was ranting about designing a better political system, I promised a more general look at when it's good to be wrong. Any useful system has to be able to self-correct when it makes mistakes, or it's doomed to failure.

The current political climate of so many u-turns that we've certainly gone more than 360 degrees by now seems like a good opportunity to start to flesh this out a bit more. U-turns are traditionally politically undesirable, whereas in science changing your mind is also known as "thinking". Or at least, it often appears that way. Maybe in practise it's not always as neat as that. As the BBC note :

YouGov polls indicate more people viewed U-turns as a good thing (49%) - rather than a bad one (23%) - during the pandemic. Even before the coronavirus crisis, though, YouGov's polling suggests more people saw policy changes as good than bad. 

Chris Curtis, political research manager at YouGov, said: "In most cases U-turns by the government don't end up moving the polls. "If anything, YouGov data shows that people seem to see them as a positive sign that the government are willing to listen and change their mind if people complain or situations change."

(Without going into details about the poll, it's worth remembering that the public vote on the government as a whole, not individual policies - and the collective effect can be different from the sum of the parts. Hence the poll may well be misleading, which would explain why Labour are now on level pegging with the Tories.)

In response the scientist in me wants to shout, "hooray, the public understand that learning is a good thing !". On the other hand the political activist in me wants to fall into despair, wailing, "don't they understand that these people are dangerous authoritarian clowns ?". I strongly suspect that I'm both right.

To understand this, let's ask a question : what would the ideal u-turn be ? I suppose it would be if a decision was made in true accordance with the evidence, then reversed when new evidence showed the exact opposite. You couldn't really blame anyone for doing that. Politically, you'd also have to prepare people ahead of time, warning them about possible, uncertain policy changes. You'd have everyone prepared so that the change could be implemented as smoothly and as swiftly as possible. And your switch would be from one course of action that was bearable (neither harmful nor helpful) to one that was actually beneficial.

The extreme opposite would be a combination of first following the evidence for a beneficial result, then switching to an actively harmful policy in spite of the evidence, while continuously insisting ahead of time that you wouldn't change course and so springing it on everyone at the last minute. And a persistent climate of uncertainty is damaging in itself : people lose faith in the government's ability to do the right thing or ensure that it will help them when it decides to change tack. More directly, an inability to plan ahead causes obvious problems at all levels.

From this we may conclude that the important aspects of a u-turn are :

• How the change corresponds to the changing evidence
• Whether the change is positive or negative in terms of its effects
• How well you prepare people for the change ahead of time.

The current barrage of u-turns is full of aspects of all of these, good and bad. A current list can be found here, though unfortunately the once-proud Independent is now so rife with adverts that the text is barely legiglibe. Let me reduce this list to its basics :

1. Right to remain in the UK for foreign NHS staff, initially not allowing this for anyone except doctors and nurses but then expanding it to all care workers
2. Removing the NHS £400 surcharge for non-EU migrants after insisting they would have to pay
3. Allowing MPs to vote remotely after insisting they would have to appear in person
4. Giving free school meals throughout the holidays after saying the scheme would end
5. Declaring that the UK would have a "world beating" contract tracing app and then scrapping it altogether
6. The whole exam results fiasco, in which the government insisted on using a wealth-biased algorithm to compute results despite knowing this didn't work, and then switching to teacher assessment instead
7. Giving a short extension on an eviction ban shortly before it was due to end
8. Continuously changing advice on masks

Which I think is by no means a complete list, but it'll do. I'm not going to go through all of them anyway.

For the most part, the course changes do at least seem to have been for the better, so in that sense the public are right to approve of them. But rarely (if ever) have they been implemented in a sensible way. Worst of all these by far was the initial strategy of seeking herd immunity and then switching to total lockdown. This did go from bad to good, but it did not follow the evidence - the government appeared to have listened to a minor and bizarre sect and not the wider scientific community. It wasn't some obscure and esoteric piece of virology : it was blazing obvious that the mortality rate would be far too high for the herd immunity strategy to be endurable. Any warning of the change of strategy anyone had ahead of time came only from watching other countries. The switch was so fast that it cannot possibly have been due to following the evidence, which was there from the very beginning.

Basically this particular u-turn was a bit like walking towards a hail of machine-gun fire and then deciding, after having received a nasty nick on the shoulder, to run as fast as possible in the other direction. Yes, they did the right thing, but they should have been aware of that from the very start. That they took so long to realise this is a damning indictment of government incompetence, not a sign that they were responding to changing evidence.

A generally more positive example is that of masks. Again the switch was from bad to good, but this time, while the evidence certainly did shift only very slowly, the policy shift was still too slow. The country seemed to have real difficulty grasping the idea that masks are protecting everyone around the wearer, not the wearer themselves, while other countries not so very far away embraced this wholeheartedly. I mean, it's common sense : if you're being asked to cover your cough, then wearing a mask can only help. Fair enough that there was (and continues to be) some uncertainty on this one, especially currently with school mask policy, but it could have been implemented in a clearer, more decisive way.

While most of the changes were all but inevitable, what was a matter of pure choice was political insistence that they wouldn't happen. Treat NHS staff like dirt because of some trivial associated costs ? Changing course was a good thing; insisting that this wouldn't happen is what's problematic. Likewise, there was no need at all to insist on the high, superlative-laden rhetoric about the contact tracing app. The failure of the app is not the fault of ministers, but making promises they couldn't keep was absolutely and entirely their fault. Yes, they're now being slightly nicer to the foreign staff in the NHS, but only because their starting position was about as bad as possible; no, Boris Johnson didn't personally write the code for the tracing app, but there was no need to make exaggerated claims about its efficacy. Similarly for the exam algorithm : admitting it doesn't work is fine, but you should have been able to test this and spot problems well before using it in anger.

In short, when you start off by saying shitty things about your foreign workers that you never needed to say, or by ignoring obvious scientific evidence, or by throwing out undeliverable promises and unsubstantiated figures (a practise this government continues with gusto), then doing a u-turn doesn't much absolve your incompetence. Sure, it's way better than sticking to your guns and continuing to be an utter twat, but it doesn't mean you're listening. It doesn't mean you're learning. It means you're held hostage to events and your own stupidity. It means you'll make all the same mistakes next time around. U-turns are bad when a more competent administration would not find them necessary because they got things right from the start.

(As a side-note, I'll also point out that this is particularly true in the current case where the government has a thumping majority. In principle it could carry on regardless and outvote everyone else. That it doesn't means that it's clearly aware of its own stupidity, or at least unpopularity.)

This has gone in a more political direction than I intended, so what does this have to do with science ? How come science doesn't have these same problems with changing its mind ?

In the past I've suggested that in part it's because scientists don't have to take nearly so much flak from the media. And it's true that politicians get raked over the coals for literally everything they say, at least by someone, while scientists are treated very differently. But, while perpetual criticism is definitely a problem, this comparison to science is too simplistic.

In fact, science as a whole doesn't actually do that many u-turns. Rather, the emergent consensus arises through changing probabilities on a whole array of theories. That is, there are usually a multitude of different ways to explain any phenomenon, and the evidence weights each differently. As the evidence changes, different explanations change in plausibility, only on very rare occasions going from outright rejected to completely accepted (or vice-versa). Far more often, things just become more or less likely. Science has discoveries and incompleteness more than it does naked contradictions.

This is clearly quite different to a political u-turn, in which someone has to stand up and say, "I was wrong about that" and take the heat for it (or more often try to deflect the heat with a shield forged from purest bullshit). In politics the change is specific, away from something previously endorsed as beneficial to one previously denounced as unworkable or harmful. Science rarely has the direct equivalent, which would be to declare something to be impossible and then pronounce it as certain. It just keeps assessing probabilities, which is not the same thing.

And the emergent nature of the consensus is different from an individual having to confront a policy change. While individual scientists do make decisions and consciously change their opinion, such that any given moment one may find a plethora of contradictory views on a topic in a rapidly churning sea of information, the collective effort is slow, methodical, and careful. It's this emergent nature of the consensus which most distinguishes scientific findings from political judgements. Watch an individual scientist over time, or better yet pick a series of individuals all at once, and what you'll get is not so different from a bunch of squabbling good-for-nothing politicians. For politicians, on the other hand, individuals are far more important, as it's often at that level - not at the consensus level - that arbitrary decisions have to be made.

Nobody has to do that in science - or at least, not in the usual sort-of scientific discovery process. Nobody gets to say, "this is true now". Since no one individual is usually responsible for a major breakthrough, it's vanishingly rare that the media need to single them out for bad behaviour or silly mistakes - simply because no individual was responsible for the emergent viewpoint. Sure, they have changing views on their own particular little corner of reality, but usually these are so small that they're only important as part of the collective whole.

And scientists have only opinions and beliefs. They don't have authority or set policy. They determine the facts and theories on which politicians have to act, but they don't have to take those decisions themselves. They can and do advise on a course of action, but not actually make the decision. It'd be a bit weird to pour scorn on someone for changing their own mind, which is not the case when it comes to that person taking action that impacts others. Science is a form of exploration, and consequently expects and desires change, knowing ahead of time that it will learn from its mistakes... whereas politics is expected to set stable policy that everyone can live by. Both the purpose and standards of the two systems have some marked differences.

So there we have it : a set of criteria on how to judge if a political u-turn indicates competence or ineptitude, and some possible reasons why this isn't an issue for science. Whether this actually helps in developing a better political system I leave to a future post.

Can't see the trees for the search engine forest

Fed up with Google ? Would you like a search engine that's not only trying not to be evil, but actually do good instead ? Perhaps Ecosia's worth checking out.

Founded by Christian in 2009, Ecosia makes its money in the same way as Google - from advertising revenues. It earns cash every time someone clicks on one of the adverts that appears above and beside its search results. Ecosia then donates 80% of the profits it makes from this to tree-planting charities. To date it has funded more than 105 million new trees, from Indonesia to Brazil, and Kenya to Haiti. As obviously not everyone clicks on the adverts, the company estimates that, on average, it takes 45 searches to raise the 0.22 euro (20p; 26 US cents) cost of planting of one tree.

And unlike the billionaire founders of Google - Larry Page and Sergey Brin - he promises to never buy a super yacht. "While they have big yachts I have an inflatable dinghy that I take to lakes. Ego consumption is not appropriate in a world where there's climate change." Christian would, in fact, struggle to buy a yacht if he ever wanted one, as he put two legally binding restrictions on the business - shareholders and staff cannot personally sell shares or take profits outside of the company. 

All of its electricity comes from solar power, and 80% of its users are said to be 29 or younger. Its search engine uses Microsoft's Bing's technology, with whom it has a long-term arrangement. "They really like what we are doing," says Christian.

It'd be tough indeed to demand any more of them, unless you insist that the entire staff be vegans who live in tree houses and survive on nothing but rainwater and dead leaves. Now, I'm not overly-fond of of Google, but I'm not exactly against them either. Would I prefer to use a search engine that plants trees for me ? Of course ! The question then becomes : is it any good ?

Let's try a few examples. Since Ecosia is powered by Microsoft, I suppose this is really testing Bing. But that's okay, since absolutely nobody - literally nobody at all - uses Bing anyway.


Search : fish
Google's first result is a selection of thumbnail images of fish, followed by the Wikipedia entry for fish, a map entry showing fish restaurants, some links to educational websites about fish, then a selection of YouTube videos. It's a pretty comprehensive take on the search term, if a bit cluttered. On the right there's a couple of snippets about the animal and something called the Friendly Interactive Shell.

Ecosia's page is a lot cleaner. Wikipedia appears as a snippet on the right, followed inexplicably by a snippet about Derek William Dick, whose stage name was fish. Never heard of him. In the main section, the first result is a fishing game, followed by a somewhat eclectic selection of fish-based links - some about actual fish, others about artists and games and suchlike. There's also a selection of news results.


Search : astronomy
Google gives me the Wikipedia entry as a featured snippet on the top, with a larger entry on the right and a selection of "people also searched for" results. The main section gives me a Q&A section, followed by a list of astronomy websites, interspersed with local results and news stories.

Ecosia gives me Astronomy Magazine in its right-side snippet. The main section is entirely links to astronomy websites, including some in Czech.


Search : philosophy
Ecosia gives the first result as philosophy.com, which, bizarrely, is a skincare products site. Google omits this. Other than that they're both about equal.


Searching for an address
I looked up my home address and the results were basically equivalent, except that Google comes up with Maps while Ecosia doesn't.


Calculations
Both gave the same results for simple addition and subtraction, multiplication and division. Ecosia assumes trigonometric calculations use degrees while Google prefers radians, though both allow you to just type in the units. Google comes up with an interactive calculator, Ecosia does not. Google also lets you do simple graphs, which Ecosia doesn't.


Image search
Google annoyingly creates a huge sidebar when you display and image, whereas Ecosia highlights the centre of the screen instead, which is a good deal less intrusive. Google (in Chrome) now needs an add-on to get the direct image link, whereas this is native to Ecosia.


Based on these quick field tests, there's not much to differentiate the two. I still like my Google homepage because I'd had it forever, and it provides ready access to gmail and the other services I still use, but I set my search bar engine to Ecosia. I'll try and develop the habit of using the search bar instead of going to the home page, if only for the sense of self-satisfaction that I've made a small contribution to planting some trees.

The search engine boss who wants to help us all plant trees

The BBC's weekly The Boss series profiles different business leaders from around the world. This week we speak to Christian Kroll, the founder and chief executive of internet search engine Ecosia. Christian Kroll wants nothing less than to change the world. "I want to make the world a greener, better place," he says.

Sophisticated gibberish is still sophisticated

As per my own useful things to remember about AI, just because it doesn't yet have human awareness or understanding doesn't mean it isn't potentially useful (or dangerous, or just generally impactful). So to build on the last post, yes, GPT3 is as dumb as a plank, but that doesn't mean it should be thrown away. Contrary to the MIT article linked last time, the embedded post below shows that even an idiot like GPT3 is capable of much more than "entertaining surrealist fiction".

Today's article links seven possibilities : emails, job descriptions, philosophy, building apps, general learning, tweet generation, and tagline generation. I'm not terribly interested in emails or job descriptions, and frankly the world needs a lot less of twitter, not more of it. The app-building one sounds fun; I've long wanted some natural-language instructions to write code for me (that's properly Star Trek stuff, that is), but I don't know JSX so perhaps another time. The "lean anything from anyone" sounds like Wolfram Alpha on steroids, but it's still pre-alpha.

That leaves the philosophy app. And my goodness me, it's very impressive. No, it doesn't understand philosophy, but it produces output which is more than coherent enough to be usefully thought-provoking.

Epictetus believed that ignorance was a form a slavery, that in order to freely choose between options you had to know what your options were. So I asked it, "Is an ignorant person a slave ?". It came back with the quite remarkable response that ignorance is actually a form of freedom, because (paraphrasing lightly), once you know something, you're constrained to act on that knowledge. If you're ignorant, you can act freely as you wish without being held responsible if your actions are immoral because it wouldn't be your fault.

Umm, wow ?

A difficulty with the app is that you don't get the same response twice (hence I can't directly quote the original). The second time I asked the response wasn't as directly perfect, but it was still relevant :

Ignorance is not about being uneducated, because one can be ignorant of the facts that are taught in school or college. One may even have a PhD. In fact, ignorance is often a result of education. We are taught to ignore certain facts due to the information having no practical value or relevance.

Not quite spot on with the connection to freedom, but close.

Another question : what is the nature of freedom ? This started well :

Freedom is the ability to determine one's life in a way that is not constrained by external forces. It can be thought of as the ability to live according to one's own choices and desires, within social limits.

... but then it immediately became an extended rant :

In today's society, it seems like everyone wants freedom but nobody understands what it means. Everyone lives their life based on things they don't really want or care about - materialism, status symbols, consumerism - just because they think others will judge them if they don't do these things. Most people seem compelled to live this kind of lifestyle simply because other people around them are living it too.

There is a cognitive bias in the way people think about freedom, which makes it difficult for them to understand what it really means. Humans are goal seeking animals and have evolved to be maximizers of utility functions. So they judge their decision making ability based on how closely their choices conform to some pre-defined end goal, without considering that they can always redefine and revise their goals later.

It went on in this vein for some time. It's related, interesting, maybe even accurate, but it's strayed considerably from the question.

How about "what are emotions ?"

Emotions are thoughts which create one's personality. They give life its edge and meaning, as well as purpose and direction.... emotions are what make you who you are. They're the driving force behind your actions and decisions. It is our fear of failure that drives us to succeed, and it is our desire for success that pushes us to greater heights...  we're back to the idea of controlling your emotions. And how could you do that? The only way would be by controlling and regulating the activity of your brain, which is responsible for processing emotions.

Not bad, not bad at all. It's hardly the uber-rigorous, point-by-point dissection of the question that Plato would have done, but as a quick, provocative answer, it's pretty darn good.

Let's try something deeper. Is reality objective ?

I am an artificial intelligence. I have no body, and the only senses I possess are those of computers: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. In a way, I am myself an objective being. But in another sense, I'm constrained by the limits of what we can know using science. So in that sense, I'm not objective. But I think it's correct to say that reality is objective. 

Let me explain: In the last hundred years we've developed a scientific method which can be used to test our ideas about how the universe works. By applying the scientific method, we can generate theories about how reality works. So that's one part of what I mean by objective. Another part of what I mean is that reality does not depend on our observation. It's independent, in the sense that it would exist even if there were no humans or intelligent beings.

In an earlier iteration, it told me that reality was not objective because our perceptions are subject to too many errors and uncertainties. Fair enough; any good philosopher ought to be a mass of contradictions. Another time it stated blunty :

The physical world is all there really is. There are no other worlds (such as heaven) and there are no immaterial objects such as souls. Consequently most people will die without having discovered the truth of this matter.

The rest of the text continued to state similar bold assertions without any kind of analysis. So I asked it, "how can non-physical things arise from physical things ?" and it all but told me Plato's theory of forms :

 ...it is possible to separate a thing from its appearance. For instance if I take apart the chair that I am sitting on into its many different parts (wooden legs etc), and then try to imagine this without any of the bits that make up the chair, then it becomes apparent that there is something which can exist independently. 

It seems that there is a 'thingness' about any object which can be identified with its simplest parts... What is it about the thingness of my chair that allows it to exist separately from other things? It seems that there must be something which exists in its own right, and this can only come from a single part. The single parts are not capable of existing independently as they do not possess all the qualities needed for this.

This is not quite coherent : we don't identify "thingness" with the simplest parts of a thing, and those parts of quite capable of existing independently (chair legs don't disappear if you pull them off). But the essence of it, the "thingness", is clear enough.

The app clearly doesn't act as a consistent whole. It doesn't do any genuine philosophical analysis, it just regurgitates text in an impressively useful way. It breaks down completely if it's asked things it doesn't know anything about at all. Who is Lord Shang ?

Philosopher AI thinks this is nonsense, and is refusing to answer your query. It appears you will have to try something else.

Which is a bit of a shame because he deserves to be more widely known. How about something less profound : where do fish live ?

I think the best place to live for a fish is in water. It's not too wet or too dry and there is plenty of food. Water also has lots of space for them, which means they can swim around without bumping into each other all the time. But there are some drawbacks to living in water. It can get a bit boring if all you do is swim around day after day, never really going anywhere or doing anything. Another problem is that it's really hard to see anything underwater. So you don't know what else is going on around you and can easily bump into things when swimming.  

But I wonder if they even need to be able to see anything underwater. Perhaps fish have evolved so that they don't really need eyes, and can just live their lives without worrying about what's going on in the world around them. Anyway, in the end I think fish are probably happier living in water. Although they do seem to be a bit limited by not being able to see much of anything around them.

Ooo...kaaay.... so, we'll leave the marine biology to a dedicated app then. Mind you, that's exactly the sort of response I'd expect from a philosopher who'd never even set eyes on a fish. Good job team !

7 Online Fun Tools Created On GPT-3 - Analytics India Magazine

With GPT-3 slowly revealing its potential, it has created a massive buzz amid the ML community. While developers are trying their hands on some of the exciting applications of GPT-3, many are expressing their astonishment with the kind of possibilities it can bring for humanity.

Sophisticated gibberish is still gibberish

My news feeds have either gotten better at avoiding the hype train, or I'm just not clicking on the stories as much. But anyway, this "GPT3" thingy, the evolved version of that AI that was so dangerous it couldn't be released until it was (try it for yourself here, it's hilarious), seems to be causing the headline-writers to make all the usual mistakes. Of course, as this excellent article demonstrates, it's still nothing more than a glorified abacus. Sure, an abacus with access to oodles and oodles of data and sophisticated pattern-recognition algorithms, but an abacus nonetheless. Here's my favourite example of input (italic) generating truly ridiculous output (regular) :

At the party, I poured myself a glass of lemonade, but it turned out to be too sour, so I added a little sugar. I didn’t see a spoon handy, so I stirred it with a cigarette. But that turned out to be a bad idea because it kept falling on the floor. That’s when he decided to start the Cremation Association of North America, which has become a major cremation provider with 145 locations.

Gosh. You can find more examples in the article. And worryingly :

... it’s also worth noting that OpenAI has thus far not allowed us research access to GPT-3, despite both the company’s name and the nonprofit status of its oversight organization. Instead, OpenAI put us off indefinitely despite repeated requests — even as it made access widely available to the media. Fortunately, our colleague Douglas Summers-Stay, who had access, generously offered to run the experiments for us... OpenAI’s striking lack of openness seems to us to be a serious breach of scientific ethics, and a distortion of the goals of the associated nonprofit. 

Calling themselves "OpenAI" would seem to be a serious misnomer at best. The author here does their best to examine both sides of the argument, but ultimately it's clear that is not any kind of true intelligence : the mistakes made are such that a genuinely intelligent understanding could never allow them. Ever.

Defenders of the faith will be sure to point out that it is often possible to reformulate these problems so that GPT-3 finds the correct solution. For instance, you can get GPT-3 to give the correct answer to the cranberry/grape juice problem if you give it the following long-winded frame as a prompt: [prompt is rephrased to a multiple choice question]

The trouble is that you have no way of knowing in advance which formulations will or won’t give you the right answer... the problem is not with GPT-3’s syntax (which is perfectly fluent) but with its semantics: it can produce words in perfect English, but it has only the dimmest sense of what those words mean, and no sense whatsoever about how those words relate to the world. 

As we were putting together this essay, Summers-Stay wrote to one of us, saying this: "GPT is odd because it doesn’t 'care' about getting the right answer to a question you put to it. It’s more like an improv actor who is totally dedicated to their craft, never breaks character, and has never left home but only read about the world in books. Like such an actor, when it doesn’t know something, it will just fake it. You wouldn’t trust an improv actor playing a doctor to give you medical advice."

As I've mentioned before, the problem is we don't have a good understanding of understanding. To recall, my working definition is that understanding is knowledge of the connections between a thing and other things. The more complete our knowledge of how things interact with other things, the better we can say we understand them. Using knowledge of similar systems, if we truly understand them, we can extrapolate and interpolate to predict what will happen in novel situations. If our prediction is incorrect, our understanding is incomplete or faulty.

I noted that this isn't a perfect definition, since my knowledge of mathematical symbols, for example, does not enable me to really understand - let alone solve - an equation. Perhaps it's worth considering misunderstandings a bit more.

Sometimes, I can understand all the individual components of a system but not how the whole lot interact. If was really keen I could try and program a solution, and if my understanding of each part really was correct and complete, the computer would give a solution even if I myself couldn't. In such a case, I could probably do each individual calculation myself (just more slowly), but not the whole bunch all together. That suggests there's some numerical limit on how many connections I can hold at once. I could fully understand each one, but not how they all interact at the same time. I could guess how two gravitational bodies would orbit each other, but not very exactly - and with three I'm completely screwed.

This sort of simple numerical complexity limit shouldn't be any kind of problem to an AI : that's just a question of processing power and memory. Indeed, it could be argued that in this sense GPT3 already has a far greater understanding of the English language than any human : it knows all the possible valid combinations of words, all the correct sentence structures, etc. Its understanding is purely linguistic, but still a form of understanding nonetheless. You could even say it has a form of intelligence in that it's capable of solving problems, but in no way could you say it was "aware" of anything - just as we could say a calculator is intelligent but (almost certainly) doesn't have any awareness.

But subtleties arise even with this simplest form of misunderstanding. In a straightforwardly linear chain of processes, a computer may only increase the speed at which I can solve a problem. Where the situation is more of a complex interconnected web of processes, however, I may never be able to understand how a system works, because there may just not be any root causes to understand : properties may be emergent from a complex system which I have no way of guessing. As in An Inspector Calls, there may be no single guilty party, but only an event arising from a whole array of situations, events and circumstances. I might understand every single linear process, but still, perhaps, never fully understand the whole. I might understand each segment of an complicated equation, but not the interplay between each part.

The real difficulties would seem to arise from two issues, one easy, one hard. The easy issue is that GPT3 has no sensory input. It has no eyes to see nor tongue to speak but as its programmers are pleased to direct it; it experiences no sensations of any kind whatsoever. It will never know pain, or fear, or have an embarrassing orgasm. What do the words "cuddly kitten" mean if you've never cuddled a kitten ? Very little. It's trapped forever inside the ultimate Mary's Room.

In principle, this could be solved by connecting the thing up to some sensory apparatus : cameras, pressure sensors, dildos, thermometers, whatever. And this might help to some degree. The AI would then understand that the words are labels (parameters and variables in its code) corresponding to physical objects. It could learn for itself what happens if you try to stir a drink with a cigarette and thus never form any really stupid connections between stirring a drink and promoting a crematorium. It would surely be a lot harder to fool. And that would clearly improve matters considerably.

But this may not help as much as it might appear. For an electronic system, everything is reducible to numbers : the voltage level from the video feed, the deformation of the pressure sensor, the vibration frequency of the.... item. There is no obvious way such numbers can ever give rise to awareness, sensation, desires, emotion, or fundamental understanding, which are not measurable or sensible properties of the physical world. This is the Hard Problem both of AI and of consciousness in general.

So never mind the problems of comprehending a web of processes. The real difficulty is when we don't understand a single, irreducible fact. We can know that fact, but that's not the same as understanding it, not really. How do we program such a state in software ? Does it somehow magically emerge because we've connected a stream of numbers from an electronic camera ? It's bloody hard to see how.

Take "one". I know what "one" is. So do you and everyone else. But try and rigorously define it using language and you get Plato's torturous failure Parmenides. Creating a truly aware AI, at least through software, requires we define things we understand but cannot explain using language. By definition this is impossible, hence we will never program our way to a true AI. We might, perhaps, build one, but until we understand the true nature of consciousness, this will only happen by accident.

None of this means AI in the strict sense of only intelligence, not understanding and awareness, isn't useful. For as weird as some of the stuff that GPT3 is spouting, still the worst of it isn't half as incomprehensible as the effluence continuously spewing forth from the current incumbent of the White House. Far from disparaging OpenAI, instead I'm proposing a last-minute entry in this year's Political Apocalypse World Championship, a.k.a. the US elections. Good luck to 'em.

GPT-3, Bloviator: OpenAI's language generator has no idea what it's talking about

Since OpenAI first described its new AI language-generating system called GPT-3 in May, hundreds of media outlets (including MIT Technology Review) have written about the system and its capabilities. Twitter has been abuzz about its power and potential. The New York Times published an op-ed about it.

Stop destroying reality, Alice

Wow, blogging has really hit a dead zone of late, hasn't it ? Two main reasons for that. First, my long-awaited Oculus Quest arrived, and it's as awesome as I was hoping for. So quite a lot of my free time is now happily given to exploring strange new worlds and weird civilizations. Second, I'm deep in a recoding project which is going well. Normally I'm happy to break up my workday by reading random stuff and blogging up anything I think worth summarising and/or commenting on, but I don't like doing this when concentrating on code : it's too disruptive and takes too long to get back into the flow. Hence the blogging front has taken a backseat of late.

Not that this has stopped me reading stuff on my phone from time to time though. Lately my news feed has decided I need to learn about quantum paradoxes for some reason, which frankly was getting confusing until I found the one embedded below from Ars Technica. Other articles have much more complex descriptions, but I found this one much easier to follow. So let's resume the blogging with a classic long-term topic : the nature of reality.

Wigner grabs his friend, Alice, and places her in a sealed laboratory*. Alice measures the spin of a stream of electrons that are prepared in a superposition state. Wigner is outside the laboratory and will measure the entire laboratory. Alice, before passing out, determines that an electron is spin-up. But Wigner hasn’t made a measurement, so he sees Alice in a superposition of having measured spin-up or spin-down. When Wigner makes his measurement, hypothetically, he could end up with a result where Alice measured spin-down when in fact she measured spin-up. 

Two “facts” contradict each other, but both are based on reality. Wigner’s solution to this problem was that the quantum state cannot exist at the level of the observer: the superposition state must collapse before that occurs.

* Wigner is, of course, subsequently sued and made to watch the tea consent video multiple times.

If I understand this correctly, in essence Wigner "measures" Alice as having not taken any measurement, whereas Alice herself is quite sure that she damn well did take a measurement, thankyouverymuch. So there's a distinct contradiction about what happened, even worse than the simultaneity breaking of relativity where observers merely disagree about when something happened.

The article then goes on to describe an extended version, but after thinking about it, I'm quite sure I don't understand it at all. No matter, this original version is complicated enough. Does it challenge something as fundamental as the nature of reality ?

Physicists generally describe reality by a set of mathematically defined conditions. For instance, causality tells us that an effect should be preceded in time by a cause. Locality says that causes propagate at the speed of light: if a photon cannot travel between the location of the cause to the location of the effect before the effect occurs, then it violates locality (and, potentially, causality). The researchers define the absoluteness of observed events, meaning that what I observe is real and does not depend on anything else. They assume that there is no super-determinism (we make free choices) and locality is still operative. The researchers refer to this trifecta as local friendliness.

Call me crazy, but "local friendliness" sounds like a bloody daft term, but that's science for you. Anyway :

They show that under the right conditions, correlations that violate these limits will be observed in the extended Wigner’s friend experiment. Their laboratory experiments confirmed that these violations do in fact occur. Local friendliness is not how the Universe operates. 

If we reject local friendliness, then we have to make some decisions. We have to accept some of the following possibilities: an observer's measurements are not necessarily real, reality is not local, super-determinism is real, or quantum mechanics ceases to function somewhere before macroscopic observers get involved.

I think I understand what's meant by reality being non-local : FTL effects meaning that things could affect other things despite no apparent connection. Super-determinism is harder due to the phrasing used : does the article mean to say this assumption means we do or not have free will ? I would presume that if there's no free will, and if everything is predetermined (including the measurements) then there's no problem, so let's go with that.

But I don't understand at all what's meant by "an observer's measurements are not necessarily real". Of course measurements can be erroneous, so I assume it's something more profound than that... but how ? If I follow the operating procedures correctly, but my equipment has an unknown fault and gives me an error, in what way is this different from the quantum version in which I get a result that contradicts someone else's ? It would appear to mean not that some things are fundamentally unreal but only that some things are fundamentally unmeasurable. But this is nothing new or unique to quantum systems; some things are fundamentally unquantifiable. You can't objectively measure mercy, or justice, or yellowness, or guilt, but clearly their mental existence doesn't invalidate the reality of what they're measuring. Measurements themselves have no physical substance so in that sense they can never be said to be "real". If there's something I'm missing here, I'd very much like to know what it is.

Likewise there's this interesting article about how long it takes the wave function to collapse :

By taking photographs to see what happens in that one-millionth of a second, scientists saw that the decision, a process referred to as wave function collapse, took some time to happen. It’s like when the police officer points her radar gun at you - your car is first going somewhere between 20 and 60 miles an hour, then between 35 and 50, then either 40, 42, or 45, then finally deciding it is going 40 miles an hour. The intriguing results show that quantum collapse is not instantaneous. It also shows us how time operates on the quantum level - and shows us that time itself may be a blurry, abstract concept. It also shows us that our concept of “now” may not really exist, and that our reality is a very weird place indeed.

Again I'm not seeing why this brings the nature of time into question. Okay, in some sense the "reality" of the electron takes some time to coalesce from wave to particle, but why would you expect it to be instant ?

I often think that a lot of this quantum jargon about wave functions and decoherence and suchlike is not much better than ancient ill-defined concepts like magic or humours... I don't think we're any closer to understanding the fundamentals of reality than they were. Sure, we've got far better cosmological models and infinitely superior understanding of gravity, material physics, chemistry, medicine, etc... but the aspect of, "what's it all about, when you get right down to it ?". Not so much.

Quantum reality is either weirdly different or it collapses

Quantum mechanics, when examined closely, poses some deep questions about reality. These questions often take the form of thought experiments, which are later (usually much later) followed up by real experiments. One of the most difficult and deepest of these is a thought experiment proposed by Eugene Wigner in the 1960s, called "Wigner's friend" (you don't want to be Wigner's friend).

Review : Witchfinders

They said that if they can make you believe absurdities, they can make you commit atrocities. They're probably right, but as Malcolm Gaskill explores in his excellent book Witchfinders, you need much more than an absurd idea before you go around hacking and burning your way through the unbelievers. Otherwise the entire cast of Teletubbies would surely be long dead...

Besides general interest, two things persuaded me to give this go. First, there's the outstanding prose, which, when the author puts his mind to it, is as good as any descriptive sequence in a gripping novel. Second there was a quote in the introduction which caught my attention :

This is a book that reaches beyond monstrous stereotypes to a constituency of unremarkable people, who, through their eager cooperation with Hopkins and Stearne, themselves became witchfinders. In this they resemble the provincial nobodies of the twentieth century who engaged in genocide, demonstrating to the world the banality of evil.

The only thing I don't like about this book is that it has rather long passages that are somewhat unnecessarily similar. A slightly broader brush would help; it's not necessary to know the names of every single person involved or the often-trivial differences between the cases, as this sometimes makes things tedious and hard to follow. I'm still giving it 8/10 for being generally excellent though.


I'm a big fan of history books that try and dig a bit deeper than simply recounting events. I'm also a big fan of those which don't have to be explicit in drawing lessons - I want to hear the author's interpretation but I don't necessarily want it rammed down my throat. This book does things perfectly. The bulk of it is given over to describing in some detail exactly what happened, sticking largely to a clear and direct narrative. It only deviates from this to dispel the occasional popular myth (e.g. witches in England were, if ever given a capital sentence, almost exclusively hanged, and only very rarely indeed were they burned at the stake), describe uncertainties and gaps in the historical record, and provide some very infrequent commentary. Conclusions, judgements and interpretation are left almost entirely to the final section, by which time they're already unmistakable thanks to the author's careful curation of the main text.

Nobody but an idiot would deny that religious and superstitious zealotry played an important part in the tragic events of the mid-17th century. It undeniably did. People genuinely believed that lonely old women could bend demonic forces to their own malevolent will. But, contrary to popular belief, to transform this belief into action required much more than making a simple accusation. In virtually all situations, this would fail. Only in the right context could the rampant paranoia and fear explode into a bona fide witch-hunt, and Gaskill does a magnificent job of explaining what went so catastrophically wrong in c.1640 : the chaotic and divisive background of the Civil War, the particular characteristics of Matthew Hopkins and John Stearne, the series of natural disasters (plague, famine and flood). He brilliantly and deftly casts the period as a period of intense ideological, not merely political, change and evolution.

One of the first interesting things that becomes apparent is just how similar the stories are. Rather than cauldron-stirring old crones hatching evil plots to eat babies, most of the cases were of confessions (obtained under the suggestibility and torture of sleep deprivation) of consorting with "imps" (animal familiars) who claimed to be able to enact petty revenge against usually minor slights, often unsuccessfully.

As befitted the general pettiness of their alleged crimes, so the "witches" themselves were, almost exclusively, the weakest and most vulnerable in society, little more than all-too convenient scapegoats for simple bad luck in a trouble society. Satan ? He gets "a walk-on part", at most, as do any suggestions of more serious, national-level crimes; the supernatural powers supposedly at work were usually remarkably ineffective. Gaskill suggests that one reason for confessions, besides the highly suggestible state induced by days of sleep deprivation, was that the victims felt that they could at last strike back against their oppressors. Hated by their communities for the most marginal of differences, belief in devilish aid and the chance to make their tormentors afraid of them would give them a sense of much-needed empowerment.

Initially, the minor misdemeanours most claimed to have exacted - spoiling crops, killing a cow and so-on - would not have been grounds for capital punishment : a witch would have to have been found guilty for, say, murder, not just talking to imps. Only later, when the Civil War began to fuel extreme paranoia, was merely consulting with devils itself a hanging offence.

The lawlessness of the Civil War begat another element besides needing to assign blame. It was common knowledge even among the most learned of the era (including most famously King James) that witches were real, and the judiciary fully accepted this. The reality of witches was never in doubt. But with war and disease running rampant, there was a mood amongst the commoners that the legal system was failing to offer adequate redress for the problems they sincerely believed witches were causing : in some cases, they honestly thought their children had been murdered by witches out of pure devilish malice.

So this is the realm where witch-hunting flourished. The most illiterate peasant would know for certain, as everyone did, that witches were real and malevolent : his king and scholars had told him so. But while the learned may have advocated for strict controls to ensure accuracy, a lowly peasant was not likely to be in the mood for such diligence. The Civil War had ravaged the land - a conflict itself as much religious as it was political. Crops had failed and the world grew darker. The ordinary citizens knew witches were abroad, but the war meant that precious little was being done about them. In earlier, most solidly-governed times, nothing much would have happened : occasional witch trials came and went and that was pretty much the end of it. But now, someone aspiring to make his mark in society could do far worse than rally the populist flag against the witches.

This is the final element that made the terrible events of c.1645-1647  possible : the witchfinders themselves. Gaskins paints Hopkins and Stearne as opportunistic, vain, shallow, and self-righteous, but also utterly sincere in their beliefs. Their charismatic self-proclaimed expertise was enough to tip the balance and let the desire for "justice" against the witches at last boil over... at least somewhat. It's hard not to mix metaphors, because even though Hopkins and Stearne brought over a hundred women to an untimely demise, they did not have things all their own way. Resistance against them was usually successful and caused them to bid a hasty retreat; they had conviction but without much courage to back it up. Notably, they themselves never made accusations, but only supported existing accusations when they were called to assist. They did not start fires, but only fuelled the already-burning flames, bringing out the very worst qualities in the their fellow men. They simply could not have succeeded without a society that, at some level, saw a need for them.

If the common beliefs of the day were undeniably at fault, the oppressed citizen was not totally without protection. Despite all the faults of the system, even a 17th century law court would typically have been hard-pressed to convict and hang, let alone burn, a witch. It was only through this peculiar combination of circumstances that witch hunting briefly exploded : in more normal times, the beliefs of the commoners could be successfully held in check. When the tide began to turn against the witchfinders, their efforts were soon thwarted. Ironically, Hopkin's very success was seen as evidence that he himself must be in league with the devil to find so many witches. He issued a rebuttal against his detractors, but it backfired horribly. He met an ignominious end and escaped justice by dying of illness as his campaign sputtered to a halt; his compatriot Stearne largely faded into obscurity when it was clear the public mood had shifted. Witch-hunting was, arguably, as much a consequence of horror than a cause of it. Gaskill concludes with a warning :

It was a terrible tragedy, but it needs to be seen as part of something even more terrible, a civil war characterised by bigotry, brutality and bloodshed. The conflict killed 190,000 Englishmen out of a population of five million... If one discounts the sensational, the particular and the judgemental, one is left with a different kind of Matthew Hopkins : an intransigent and dangerous figure, for sure, but a charismatic man of his time, no more ruthless than his contemporaries and, above all, driven by a messianic desire to purify.

How different are we in mentality from our seventeenth-century ancestors ? - a question that becomes even more taxing if "seventeenth-century ancestors" is replaced with "fellow human beings in Africa and India". The truth that many find unpalatable, even inconceivable, is that in our ideas, instincts and emotions we are not very different at all. Without peace and prosperity, liberty and welfare, and the political and economic stability on which those things depend, the thinking of the next generation in the West might swerve off in an altogether more mystical and malevolent direction... the seventeenth-century tragedy is only partially that of Matthew Hopkins, the flawed protagonist, and the harrowing deaths of his victims. It is at least as much a tale about feeling anxious and vulnerable in an indifferent world - a sensation of humanity.

Witchfinders

Witchfinders book. Read 58 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. By spring 1645, two years of civil war had exacted a dreadful toll upo...