Sister blog of Physicists of the Caribbean in which I babble about non-astronomy stuff, because everyone needs a hobby

Tuesday 29 January 2019

An intelligent (but still unconvincing) case for panpsychism

Excellent. This ties together a lot of different ideas I've heard about previously in a much more coherent way than I've seen before. For my part, I have no problem with accepting a non-physical component to reality (https://astrorhysy.blogspot.com/2018/09/this-equation-shows-you-cant-quantify.html). I do not accept the conclusion presented herein of panpsychism (I am not in the least convinced by it), but the article presents the case in a far more intelligent way than I've seen previously.

No matter how precisely we could specify the mechanisms underlying, for example, the perception and recognition of tomatoes, we could still ask: Why is this process accompanied by the subjective experience of red, or any experience at all? Why couldn’t we have just the physical process, but no consciousness? The hard problem of consciousness would seem to persist even given knowledge of every imaginable kind of physical detail.

One might wonder how physical particles are, independently of what they do or how they relate to other things. What are physical things like in themselves, or intrinsically? Some have argued that there is nothing more to particles than their relations, but intuition rebels at this claim. For there to be a relation, there must be two things being related. Otherwise, the relation is empty—a show that goes on without performers, or a castle constructed out of thin air. In other words, physical structure must be realized or implemented by some stuff or substance that is itself not purely structural. Otherwise, there would be no clear difference between physical and mere mathematical structure, or between the concrete universe and a mere abstraction. But what could this stuff that realizes or implements physical structure be, and what are the intrinsic, non-structural properties that characterize it? The philosopher Galen Strawson has called it the hard problem of matter.

What is the hardware that implements the software of Newton’s equations? One might think the answer is simple: It is implemented by solid particles. But solidity is just the behaviour of resisting intrusion and spatial overlap by other particles—that is, another mere relation to other particles and space. The hard problem of matter arises for any structural description of reality no matter how clear and intuitive at the structural level.

The hard problem of matter calls for non-structural properties, and consciousness is the one phenomenon we know that might meet this need. Consciousness is full of qualitative properties, from the redness of red and the discomfort of hunger to the phenomenology of thought. Such experiences, or “qualia,” may have internal structure, but there is more to them than structure. We know something about what conscious experiences are like in and of themselves, not just how they function and relate to other properties.

This suggests that consciousness—of some primitive and rudimentary form—is the hardware that the software described by physics runs on. The physical world can be conceived of as a structure of conscious experiences. Our own richly textured experiences implement the physical relations that make up our brains. Some simple, elementary forms of experiences implement the relations that make up fundamental particles. Take an electron, for example. What an electron does is to attract, repel, and otherwise relate to other entities in accordance with fundamental physical equations. What performs this behavior, we might think, is simply a stream of tiny electron experiences.

Dual-aspect monism comes in moderate and radical forms. Moderate versions take the intrinsic aspect of matter to consist of so-called protoconscious or “neutral” properties: properties that are unknown to science, but also different from consciousness. The nature of such neither-mental-nor-physical properties seems quite mysterious. Like the aforementioned quantum theories of consciousness, moderate dual-aspect monism can therefore be accused of merely adding one mystery to another and expecting them to cancel out.

The most radical version of dual-aspect monism takes the intrinsic aspect of reality to consist of consciousness itself. This is decidedly not the same as subjective idealism, the view that the physical world is merely a structure within human consciousness, and that the external world is in some sense an illusion. According to dual-aspect monism, the external world exists entirely independently of human consciousness. But it would not exist independently of any kind of consciousness, because all physical things are associated with some form of consciousness of their own, as their own intrinsic realizer, or hardware.

https://getpocket.com/explore/item/is-matter-conscious

4 comments:

  1. This is a really elegant, parsimonious argument for panpsychism, but I just can't accept it. Introspection tells me that *I* am not a conglomeration of trillions of little minds. *I* am not a compound object. *I* am an irreducible unity.

    Some say introspection can't tell you anything about consciousness. I disagree. I think we have direct knowledge of the nature of experience itself, if not it's underlying structure. The direct knowledge of one's own immediate experience is the most certain knowledge one can possess. As far as I'm concerned, the unity of (my) self (that which is the bearer of my experiences) is as undeniable and axiomatic as the bedrock of all logic -- the law of identity. Sorry, but *I* exist.

    So for me, the only two options are idealism or substance dualism. 🤷🏻‍♂️

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    Replies
    1. Yes, I tend to agree. Panpsychism is not as mad as it may first appear, but I still don't buy it. I agree with John Locke (recent trilogy : https://astrorhysy.blogspot.com/2021/02/i-like-locke-i-knowing-what-you-know.html), that we can know our own thoughts with true certainty. We don't necessarily know the true nature of what causes the experience, but we do know the experience itself. I suppose its possible that what we think of as singular is actually multiple, but this doesn't seem very likely to me. Also, panpsychism doesn't actually explain anything - it just says that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, and nothing about what gives rise to it.

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    2. >>>Also, panpsychism doesn't actually explain anything - it just says that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, and nothing about what gives rise to it.<<<

      That's actually the one part of panpsychism that I agree with. I think conscious experience must be a fundamental aspect of reality in one way or another. I just can't even conceive of experience being "explained" in terms of something else any more than time (which I think must also be fundamental) can be "explained" in terms of something "not-time".

      BTW, I just discovered this blog and I'm really enjoying it, particularly the stuff on consciousness. I definitely have similar intuitions about experience as you (although, I don't consider them mere intuitions--more like self-evident axioms).

      PS Are you on Twitter? There's a great community of consciousness geeks there, kind of a subset of "Philosophy Twitter"!

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    3. Well thanks ! I'm glad someone is enjoying it. :) I have some other discussions on consciousness with some very differently-minded people that I've been meaning to collate but just didn't the find time to draft yet. Will put that on my to-do list for this week. Otherwise, check out "Physicists of the Caribbean" for (much) longer pieces.

      I'm not on Twitter - I'm on the much more obscure Pluspora (https://pluspora.com/people/f49a12c009460137b3ce005056264835) but I really miss Google Plus ! :(

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